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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the Supreme Court's narrow construction of Rule 10b-
51 in recent years, plaintiffs continue to bring numerous actions
under the Rule since it provides an effective remedy in more situa-
tions than any other statutory provision and remains broader than
common law fraud. The tremendous growth in the utility of 10b-5
since its adoption in 1942 has been due in no small part to the
activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On
many occasions, the SEC has sought enforcement of 10b-5 and an-
cillary relief in the courts, and has imposed sanctions upon violators
of 10b-5 in administrative disciplinary proceedings. Many of these
court and administrative decisions are regarded as milestones in
10b-5 jurisprudence. It is the purpose of this Article to examine the
wide range of remedies available to the SEC for violations of Rule
10b-5. Among the relief discussed will be those remedies obtainable
only upon court order, those imposable administratively by the SEC
itself, and the relief afforded to the SEC where a defendant consents
thereto.
II. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE SEC IN CONTESTED COURT CASES
A. Injunctions
Unlike the situations in which injunctions may be sought by
private parties, Congress has expressly authorized the SEC to bring
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchaae or
sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5 (the Rule or 10b-5) was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (the SEC) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976). The 1934 Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976). The other major securities
statute is the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
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injunctive actions in section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as follows:
Wherever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is
engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a
violation of any provision of [the 1934 Act], the rules or regula-
tions thereunder, the rules of a national securities exchange or
registered securities association of which such a person is a mem-
ber or a person associated with a member, the rules of a registered
clearing agency in which such person is a participant, or the rules
of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, it may in its dis-
cretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United
States, the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia or the United States courts of any territory or other place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts
or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.2
Several points are clear from the face of the statute. First, the
words "any person. . . engaged or. . . about to engage in any acts
or practices constituting a violation" indicate that a person can be
enjoined even though his activities do not yet constitute a breach
of the law.3 Second, the statute requires "a proper showing [to be
made for] a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining
order." This wording suggests that the measure of a "proper show-
ing" is identical for all three types of injunctions.4 Subject to a few
variations discussed later,' case law generally reflects this approach.
Finally, section 21(d) contains no provision requiring that a bond
be posted.
In Hecht Co. v. Bowles,I the Supreme Court explained the basis
of a court's power to issue an administrative injunction:
A grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders hardly suggests
an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances. We
cannot but think that if Congress had intended to make such a
drastic departure from the traditions of equity practice, an unequi-
vocal statement of its purpose would have been made .. . We are
dealing here with the requirements of equity practice with a back-
2 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
3 SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975)
(court may enjoin a defendant who committed, is about to commit, or is committing a
violation); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969) (court may enjoin
potential fraud).
SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975).
See note 24 and accompanying text infra.
' 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
1979]
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ground of several hundred years of history. Only the other day we
stated that: 'An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on
federal district courts is an appeal to the sound discretion which
guides the determinations of courts of equity.' . . . The historic
injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish. The es-
sence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor
to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the
particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished
it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the
instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the
public interest and private needs as well as between competing
private claims. We do not believe that such a major departure from
that long tradition as is here proposed should be lightly implied.,
Although the Hecht Court was construing the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942,8 the principles enunciated therein apply equally
to injunctions sought by the SEC. Thus, in the context of SEC
enforcement actions, it has been stated that the grant or denial of
an injunction is within the discretion of the trial court,9 that equita-
ble considerations may enter a trial judge's determination ' so long
as the court adheres to the precept that injunctions are designed to
deter rather than to punish, and that a judge has the flexibility
required to mould each decree to the particular circumstances pre-
sented to achieve the fairest and most practical result.'" Due to the
broad discretion given a trial court, an appellate court will reverse
7 Id. at 329-30 (citations omitted).
Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 901-925 (1976)).
See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868-69 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc)(Friendly, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 486-
87 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. American Inst. Counselors,
Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,388, at 98,962 (D.D.C. 1975);
SEC v. Petersen, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,254, at 98,318
(D. Minn. 1975); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226, 232 (D.R.I. 1973); SEC v.
Computronic Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136, 1138 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868-69 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)(Friendly, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 726-27 (N.D. Cal. 1976); SEC
v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Parklane
Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC
v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP., (CCH) 95,532, at
99,702 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd in part, affd in part, 575 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. J &
B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974); SEC v. Computronic Indus. Corp.,
294 F. Supp. 1136, 1138 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
12 See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 1976).
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the grant or denial of an injunction only if it finds an abuse of
discretion. 3
It is against this background that the "proper showing" de-
manded by section 21(d) can be defined. The popular verbalization
of the "proper showing" test is whether there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that the defendant will commit violations in the future.14 In
the case of preliminary injunctions, the inquiry becomes whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant will commit fur-
ther violations pendente lite. 5 In another context, the Supreme
Court has held that the plaintiffs past exposure to illegal conduct
does not in and of itself show a present case or controversy calling
for injunctive relief."6 Consistent with this holding, courts have held
that the SEC could not obtain an injunction unless some cognizable
danger of recurrent violation exists. 7 Yet, the SEC has never been
required to prove that the defendant has a natural inclination to
violate the securities laws. 8 As will be discussed below, courts scru-
tinize a number of factors in determining whether or not the "proper
showing" has been made. 9
While the circuit courts of appeals have adopted a variety of
standards to determine whether preliminary injunctions are appro-
priate in private actions,"s these standards do not govern injunctive
actions brought by the SEC.2 Consequently, most courts hold that
" SEC v. Senex Corp., 534 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d
1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 389,
394, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d
Cir. 1972); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972).
"1 See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d
1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1976); SEC v.
Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F.
Supp. 477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Koracorp Indus.,
Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,532, at 99,702 (N.D. Cal.
1976), rev'd in part, affd in part, 575 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Jet Travel Servs., Inc.,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,317, at 98,608 (M.D. Fla. 1975);
SEC v. J & B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974); SEC v. R.J. Allen &
Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 877 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. IMC Int'l, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 889,
893 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
" See Matthews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 5 Rsv. SEC. REo. 969 (1972).
" O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974), quoted in duPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D.
615, 634 (D. Del. 1973).
'1 See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 296 (D.D.C.
1973); SEC v. Keller Indus., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH)
93,453, at 92,239 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,
633 (1953)).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1101 (2d Cir. 1972).
" See notes 29-62 and accompanying text infra.
See JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RuLE 10b-5 § 260.04[c][ii] (1978).
21 SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Briga-
19791
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the SEC need not allege or prove irreparable injury to get a prelimi-
nary or a permanent injunction.22 Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, however, requires that a plaintiff seeking a tem-
porary restraining order, in this case the SEC, demonstrate that
irreparable injury will result unless the order is granted.2 Thus, the
SEC usually avoids the issue whether it is exempt from proving
irreparable injury when seeking a temporary restraining order, by
alleging that irreparable injury will ensue absent the order.24 Nor
need the SEC show that te balance of equities tips in its favor.2
Finally, the inadequacy of other remedies - an ingredient which is
often a prerequisite to the issuance of an injunction in a private
action - need not be demonstrated in an SEC enforcement action.26
doon Scotch Distribs., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. American Inst.
Counselors, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,388, at 98,962-
63 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Jet Travel Servs., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,317, at 98,608 (M.D. Fla. 1975); SEC v. Petersen, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,254, at 98,318 (D. Minn. 1975); SEC v. R.J. Allen &
Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 875 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
2 See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir.
1977); SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v.
Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Jet Travel
Servs., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,317, at 98,608 (M.D.
Fla. 1975); SEC v. J & B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974); SEC v. R.J.
Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 875 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
A showing of irreparable injury was required, however, in SEC v. Senex Corp., 534 F.2d
1240 (6th Cir. 1976), affg 399 F. Supp. 497, 508 (E.D. Ky. 1975). Cf. SEC v. Petersen, [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,254, at 98,319 (D. Minn. 1975) (immi-
nent threatened harm required to be shown).
= FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1980 (1961).
See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975); cf. 'SEC v.
Senex Corp., 534 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th Cir. 1976) (injunction granted with no discussion of
merits); SEC v. Petersen, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,254,
at 98,318 (D. Minn. 1975).
" SEC v. Jet Travel Servs., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,317, at 98,608 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
Aside from the question of what constitutes a "proper showing," certain other issues
pertinent to the issuance of injunctions sought by the SEC are noteworthy. First is the rule
that a defendant cannot defeat the SEC's motion for an injunction either on the ground that
the act constituting the violation cannot be performed, see, e.g., SEC v. R.A. Holman & Co.,
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,554, at 95,087 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
affl'd, 366 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1966); cf. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir.
1969) (injunction available although attempt to defraud failed), or on the ground that no one
was defrauded by the objectionable conduct. See, e.g., id. Second, judges rarely grant the
SEC mandatory preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., SEC v. Garfinkle, [1974-1975 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 95,020, at 97,578 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Third, SEC enforce-
ment actions are not meant to be the sole device to police securities frauds. Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 502-03, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 84-85 (1969).
Private causes of action remain a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement proceedings. See
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It appears that the touchstone for the courts in issuing prelimi-
nary injunctions at the request of the SEC is the presence of a
reasonable likelihood that the defendant will commit securities vio-
lations in the future.Y The inquiry to be made is a question of fact.2'
With these guidelines, several factors which courts utilize to ascer-
tain if injunctive relief is warranted will now be discussed.
(1) Past Conduct. A number of courts have held that prior
illegal conduct is highly suggestive of the likelihood of future viola-
tions.29 Other courts have required the SEC to establish a strong
prima facie case of a securities law violation, after which the burden
is shifted to the defendants to prove that there is no reasonable
likelihood that illegal acts will be repeated.-" Under either approach,
whether the inference of future violations is properly drawn depends
upon all the facts.31 Past illegal conduct, without more, therefore,
JAcoBs, supra note 20, § 8.01 & nn. 8-10. Fourth, the SEC can institute an injunctive action
sua sponte, although no member of the public has informed the commission of the alleged
violations. See, e.g., SEC v. R.A. Holman & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FE. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,554, at 95,093 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Fifth, a court may properly condition its
denial of an injunction to the SEC upon a defendant's restitution or disgorgement of profits,
see, e.g., SEC v. Bond & Share Corp., 229 F. Supp. 88, 97-98 (W.D. Okla. 1963), an injunction
issuing only if the defendant fails to meet the conditions of the order. Sixth, if the SEC is
denied injunctive relief, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the complaint. See, e.g., SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
Seventh, the grant of a preliminary injunction does not insure that a permanent injunction
will also be issued. E.g., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 326 F. Supp. 588, 592 (S.D. Fla.
1971), rev'd, 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); see SEC v. Senex Corp., 534 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th
Cir. 1976). In fact, the SEC may obtain a permanent injunction although a court has denied
it a preliminary injunction. See id. Finally, the SEC can obtain an injunction against miscon-
duct which constitutes a crime as well. See Wax, The Emerging SEC Injunction, 17 N.Y.L.F.
785, 785 (1971).
" See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
" See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975).
21 See, e.g., id.; SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972);
SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co.,
422 F. Supp. 477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Galaxy
Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1248-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977);
SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,388, at 98,963 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Blatt, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 95,281, at 98,444 (S.D. Fla. 1975); SEC v. Petersen, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,254, at 98,319 (D. Minn. 1975); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc.,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,226, at 98,188 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
SEC v. J & B Indus. Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974); SEC v. R.J. Allen &
Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 877 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. IMC Int'l, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 889,
894 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
10 See, e.g., SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
SEC v. Rega, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. San. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,222, at 98,149
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Globus Int'l, Ltd., 320 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
11 See,'e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Parkane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir.
1979]
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will not necessarily justify an injunction.32
(2) Nature of the Prior Violation. Where a defendant pre-
viously has been found to have violated the securities laws, addi-
tional factors enter the court's inquiry with respect to the injunction
presently sought. Judges have considered, for example, whether the
earlier violation was an isolated incident of mischief or indicative
of the defendant's propensity to disregard the law.s Courts also
have viewed the seriousness of the past violations34 as well as the
motive and intent of the defendant when engaging in the illegal
activities." Part of this inquiry is directed toward ascertaining
whether the defendant acted in reliance on the advice of counsel.
While such reliance is surely relevant to the question of the defen-
dant's mental culpability, a defendant can be enjoined even if he
acted in reliance on an attorney's advice.36 In addition, the court will
inquire whether the defendant has requested the SEC's advice on a
close question.37
In analyzing the prior violation, courts also have examined the
1977); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,226,
at 98,188 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Globus Int'l, Ltd., 320 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
n Although a prior injunctive proceeding may be deemed to give rise to an inference of
future violations, see SEC v. D'Onofrio, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,201, at 98,019 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Weisberger, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,108, at 97,943 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), there is no requirement that a
court must enjoin a person who was enjoined in the past. See SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp.,
331 F. Supp. 1154, 1162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified sub nom. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., v.
Piper Aircraft Corp. 480 F,2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
31 See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc)(Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. P. 1976); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co.,
422 F. Supp. 477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), alfd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Commer-
cial Inv. & Dev. Corp., 373 F. Supp. 1153, 1165 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. Computronic Indus.
Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136, 1138 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
14 See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 387 (2d Cir.)
(Timbers, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597-98
(E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. lannelli, [1974-1975 Traisfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,964, at 97,317 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 )1969); SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F.
Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
u See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1101 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Lumns, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assocs., 362 F.
Supp. 226, 233 (D.R.I. 1973).
" E.g., SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 448-50 (2d Cir. 1937); see SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assocs.,
362 F. Supp. 226, 238 (D.R.I. 1973); SEC v. Liberty Petroleum Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rap. (CCH) 93,209, at 91,348 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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degree of the defendant's complicity in"s and the novelty of the
violation.3 Courts have enjoined defendants even where their
breach of 10b-5 as found by the court represents an expansion of the
Rule." Finally, courts consider the elapsed time since the defen-
dant's last breach.' It appears that the SEC's chances of obtaining
the injunction rise as the time between violations decreases.
(3) Cessation of Prior Conduct. Whether a defendant ceases
or continues his violative conduct also bears on the reasonable likeli-
hood that he will violate the federal securities laws in the future.
Cessation does not ipso facto justify denial of an injunction.2 The
defendant presents his strongest case when he had ceased his viola-
tions prior to learning of the SEC's actual or imminent investigation
of his activities and its intention to take action against him. If a
defendant has stopped the activity after learning of the SEC's inter-
est, he adds a little strength to his case." A defendant who continues
his activities despite the SEC's interest in the matter is in the
weakest position of all. 5 Moreover, a court can take into account the
See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
modified, 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Computronic Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136,
1140 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
' See, e.g., SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 297 (D.D.C. 1973).
40 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
11 E.g., SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see SEC v.
Koracorp Indus., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,532, at
99,702 (N.D. Cal. 1976), revud in part, affd in part, 575 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 297 (D.D.C. 1973).
42 See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1101 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d
1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir.
1968)(en banc)(Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Frank,
388 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1387-
88 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641,651 (D.D.C.
1975); SED v. J & B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974); SEC v. Dott, 302
F. Supp. 169, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For a discussion of older cases where an injunction was
denied after the defendants ceased their acts, see Wax, The Emerging SEC Injunction, 17
N.Y.L.F. 785, 787 (1971).
,1 SEC v. Dott, 302 F. Supp. 169, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see SEC v. Bond & Share
Corp., 229 F. Supp. 88, 97-98 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
" See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v.
Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. D'Onofrio, [1975-1976 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,201, at 98,019 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Garfinkle,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,020, at 97,579 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
SEC v. J & B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (D. Mass. 1974); SEC v. Broadwall Sec.,
Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"See SEC v. IMC Int'l, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 889, 894 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 505 F.2d 733 (5th
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adequacy of those procedures designed to prevent future violations
adopted by the defendant after he discovers the prior breach."
(4) Disclaimer of Intent to Violate in the Future. Although a
defendant's disclaimer of intent to violate the federal securities laws
in the future 7 mitigates against the need for an injunction, it does
not preclude a court from granting an injunction.48 The sincerity of
the defendant may be evaluated by the court"9 in the light of the
many other factors weighing in favor of granting an injunction.
(5) The Defendant's Opportunity to Commit Future
Violations. A court should also consider the defendant's opportunity
to commit the future violation that the SEC seeks to have en-
joined. 0 Thus, persons who remain associated with a public com-
pany or with a brokerage firm are more likely to be enjoined than
those who do not. 1 It follows that, when the SEC seeks-an injunction
regarding the securities of only one company, a court may deny the
request if the defendant no longer works for that company and is no
longer in the securities business.52 The defendant's age1 and health'
may also be pertinent to this inquiry.
(6) The Defendant's Admission of Guilt. A judge is more
likely to grant an injunction against a defendant who continues to
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); SEC v. Koenig, (1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,536, at 92,561 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972);
SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" See SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
'7 The disclaimer should also encompass the rules of bodies other than the SEC that are
mentioned in § 21(d), such as national securities exchanges.
"See SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 651 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. J &
B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974).
"1 See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1101 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v.
Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 652 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962,
968-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); SEC v. Kamen & Co., 241 F. Supp. 430, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The
defendant's sincerity is a question of fact. SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
0 See, e.g., SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597-98 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v.
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360
F. Supp. 284, 297, 300 (D.D.C. 1973).
"1 See, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1974); see SEC v. Parklane
Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp 477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). In
one case, the defendant's retirement from a municipal bond business did not prevent a court
from enjoining him. SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assocs., Inc. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 93,756, at 93,306 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
52 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 300 (D.D.C. 1973).
"See SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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contend that his prior conduct was blameless than a defendant who
admits that his past acts violated the securities laws. 5
(7) The Defendant's Compensation to Injured Persons. An-
other factor bearing on the propriety of an injunction is whether the
defendant cured the injury he inflicted, by cancelling the transac-
tion disgorging his profits or performing some other act. 6 The defen-
dant's case is strongest where he acts before the SEC begins its
investigation."
(8) Equitable and Policy Considerations. Because a perma-
nent injunction is a harsh remedy,58 some judges will consider the
injunction's effect on the defendant.' Prior to issuing the order,
courts should attempt to determine if an injunction will so drasti-
cally interfere with the defendant's business that his victims may
not be recompensed.10 Weighing these considerations is analogous to
the balancing of hardships in which the court will engage when a
private party seeks a preliminary injunction.6 Courts will deny a
preliminary injunction on equitable grounds if the SEC delayed too
long in bringing suit after starting its investigation. 2
5 See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1101 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 597 (E.D.Pa. 1976); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec.,
Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part, modified in part, 574 F.2d 90
(2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 652 (D.D.C.
1975); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,226,
at 98,189 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. D'Onofrio, [1975-1976 Transfer Bifider] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) T 95,201, at 98,019 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. IMC Int'l, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 889, 894
(N.D. Tex.), affl'd, 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); SEC v.
Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
5' See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082,1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Lawson, 24 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Md. 1938).
57 See, e.g., SEC Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. D'Onofrio, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. EP. (CCH) 95,201, at 98,019
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
11 See SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binderl FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) T 95,532, at 99,702 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 575 F.2d 692 (9th
Cir. 1978).
11 See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Petrofunds, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 652 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assocs., 362 F.
Supp. 226, 233, (D.R.I. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284,
297 (D.D.C. 1973); SEC v. Keller Indus., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,453, at 92,239 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp.
962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (although effect on defendant is relevant, public interest superior
to private interest when in conflict). But see SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 252 (2d Cir.
1959); SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
See note 175 and accompanying text infra.
" See Jcosm, supra note 20, § 260.04[c][ii].
42 See SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd. 558
F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); JACOBS, supra note 20, § 236. In a close case, the court may choose
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After considering these factors, a judge who grants an injunc-
tion must then carefully define the scope of his order. An injunction
issued in respect of a prior or anticipated 10b-5 breach typically
restrains future breaches of the Rule." Rule 65(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, constrains the scope of any in-
junction granted by a federal judge by providing that "[e]very
order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set
forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; [and]
shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the
complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be re-
strained . . .. ,"" Specificity in the order is needed so that the
defendant is adequately apprised of the acts in which he may not
engage. Specificity is also constitutionally mandated, since a court
is prohibited from enforcing by contempt an injunction that is so
nebulous that the defendant lacks the knowledge needed to com-
ply." Nevertheless, lower courts have incorporated the statutory
language of the securities laws into injunctions,"6 enjoining acts
that bear little resemblance to the defendant's allegedly illegal
actions. 7 This is not to say, however, that an injunction's sweep
must be narrow. An injunction may prohibit activities that were
not involved in the previous illegal acts. 8 The persons whose
to safeguard the public interest by resolving doubts in favor of granting the injunction. See,
e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 386 (2d Cir.)(Timbers, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
Although construing a statute other than the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court, in NLRB
v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941), considered the proper scope of injunctions
issuing from federal courts, and enunciated principles which are equally applicable to 10b-5:
A federal court has broad power to restrain acts which are of the same type or class
as unlawful acts which the court has found to have been committed or whose
commission in the future, unless enjoined, may fairly be anticipated from the
defendant's conduct in the past. But the mere fact that a court has found that a
defendant has committed an act in violation of a statute does not justify an injunc-
tion broadly to obey the statute and thus subject the defendant to contempt pro-
ceedings if he shall at any time in the future commit some new violation unlike and
unrelated to that with which he was originally charged.
Id. at 435-36.
, FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
See United States v. Joyce, 498 F.2d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 1974); Finney v. Arkansas Bd.
of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 213 (8th Cir. 1974).
E.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Center, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102-03 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1102. But see SEC v. Seaboard Sec. Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,697, at 95,564 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102-03 (2d Cir. 1972);
SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in
part, modified in part, 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. J & B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp.
1082 (D. Mass. 1974); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 465, 468
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), affl'd, 511 F.2d 1217 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); SEC v.
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actions may be affected by an injunction need not be limited to
those who are primarily liable for the prior breach. A court can
enjoin aiders and abettors of a violation, including officers of a
corporation or of a broker-dealer." There is also authority outside
the securities area for the proposition that a court can hold a person
who has violated the law to a higher standard of future conduct
than someone who has not.7" With these principles to guide them,
courts have ordered defendants to amend their prior filings with
the SEC,7" directed a corporation to establish written guidelines
for the dissemination of corporate information to the investment
community,72 prohibited a defendant from acting or continuing to
act as a director or office of any public company without the court's
permission,73 and directed a defendant to comply with the reporting
requirements of section 16(a) of the 1934 Act.74
The obvious criticism of an injunction against future violations
is that it commands a defendant to obey the law, something he is
already obligated to do. There are, however, other direct and indi-
rect consequences flowing from the injunction.7" A direct effect is
that the defendant can be prosecuted for civil or criminal contempt
if he violates the injunction. A judge, acting without a jury, may
impose a jail sentence of up to six months for criminal contempt. 76
In addition, numerous provisions of the securities laws impose re-
strictions on persons who have been permanently or temporarily
enjoined."
Raffer, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,632, at 98,836 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); SEC v. Seaboard Sec. Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
91,697, at 95,564 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,229, at 98,214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
41 E.g., SEC v. Aaron, No. 77-6091 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 1978); SEC v. Barraco, 438 F.2d
97, 98-100 (10th Cir. 1971); SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 981 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); see JAcoBs, supra note 20, § 40.02 n.4 and cases cited therein; cf. SEC v. Coven, 581
F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3584 (1979) (§ 17(a) of 1933 Act).
70 See Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1962).
11 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
72 SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 94,501, at 95,759 (D. Ariz. 1974).
" SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 259 F. Supp. 99, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd in part,
vacated in part, 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
72 With respect to other advantages of the injunction route, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1980-83 (1961).
1 Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 150 (1969); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S.
373, 380 (1966).
" Section 9(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 makes it a crime for a person,
who is permanently or temporarily enjoined, to serve in the capacity of employee, officer,
director, member of an advisory board, investment advisor, or depositor of a registered invest-
ment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(2) (1976). Section 9(c) permits the SEC (as distin-
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B. Ancillary Relief
In addition to the injunctions that may be granted pursuant to
section 21(d) of the 1934 Act, the courts have ordered a number of
other remedies in contested actions brought by the SEC. These
other remedies are termed ancillary or equitable relief and include:
disgorgement of profits; rescission; appointment of a receiver, trus-
tee, or special agent; required filing of informational reports; and a
court ordered freeze on the defendant's assets.
Several approaches have been suggested to justify the courts'
power to grant ancillary relief.7" The second circuit, in SEC v.
guished from the staff) to lift or waive this disqualification. Id. at § 80a-9(c).
Rule 252(c)(4) of the 1933 Act proscribes the use of a Regulation A offering circular if
the issuer or any of its affiliates has been temporarily or permanently restrained. 17 C.F.R. §
230.252(c)(4) (1978).
Rule 252(d)(2) prohibits the use of a Regulation A offering circular if any director, officer,
principal, security holder, or promoter of the issuer, any underwriter of the offering or any
partner, director, or officer of any such underwriter has been temporarily or permanently
enjoined. Id. § 230.252(d)(2). Rule 252(f) allows the SEC to waive the prohibitions of Rules
252(c)(4) and 252 (d)(2). Id. § 230.252(f).
Section 15(b)(4)(C) of the 1934 Act empowers the SEC, after notice and opportunity
for a hearing, to censure, deny registration to, suspend for not more than one year, or revoke
the registration of any broker-dealer who is permanently or temporarily enjoined. 15 U.S.C.
§ 780(b)(4)(C) (1976).
Section 15(b)(6) of the 1934 Act permits the SEC, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, to censure any person or to bar him for up to one year from being associated with a
broker-dealer if he is permanently or temporarily enjoined. Id. § 780(b)(6) (1976).
Sections 203(e)(3) and 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 allow the SEC to
discipline an investment adviser on the same grounds as §§ 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) of the 1934
Act permit the SEC to sanction a broker-dealer. Id. §§ 80b-3(e)(3), (f) (1976).
Under Rule 1I(e)(3) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, the SEC may censure or temporarily
or permanently suspend from appearing or practicing before the SEC any attorney, accoun-
tant, engineer, or other professional or expert who was permanently enjoined. 17 C.F.R. §
201.2(e)(3) (1978).
Disclosure of a permanent or temporary injunction is specifically required in a Schedule
14D-1 (Item 2(f)), 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,284C (1979), a Form S-2 (Item 8(f)(3)), 2
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7,143 (1976), and, by reference to Item 3(f)(3)(iii) of Regulation
S-K, 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 70,961 (1979), in a Form S-1 (Item 16), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 7,123 (1978), a Form 10 (Item 6), 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 27,303 (1978), a form
10-K (Item 14), 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CGH) 31,104 (1978), and a proxy statement (Item 6 of
Schedule 14A), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7,282 (1976). In addition, case law may mandate
disclosure of such an injunction in these or other documents. See JACOBS supra note 20, §
61.04[bI n.130.01 and accompanying text.
An injunction is required to be reported in various forms which a registered broker-dealer
or a registered investment adviser must file with the SEC, the NASD, or a stock exchange.
Under some state blue sky laws, an injunction against a broker, dealer, or investment
adviser permits the state administrator to invoke sanctions, UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §
204(a)(2)(D), and an injunction relating to a registered security permits the state administra-
tor to deny, suspend, or revoke his state registration of that security. Id. § 306(a)(2)(C).
" See JACOBS, supra note 20, § 15. As to the basis for equitable relief in private 10b-5
actions, see id. § 260.04 [a].
SEC REMEDIES
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,79 has stated:
It is now well established that Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act
• . . and Section 27 of the 1934 Act . . . confer general equity
powers upon the district courts. Once the equity jurisdiction of the
district court has been properly invoked by a showing of a securi-
ties law violation, the court possesses the necessary power to fash-
ion an appropriate remedy. Thus, while neither the 1933 nor 1934
Acts specifically authorize the ancillary relief granted in this case,
'[i]t is for the federal courts to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief where federally secured rights are invaded.'
Moreover, as the Supreme Court said in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970): '[W]e cannot fairly infer from the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose to circumscribe the
courts' power to grant appropriate remedies.' It is true that Mills
• . . involved relief to private litigants. Nevertheless, we recently
said that 'we deem the above statement [in Mills] to be fully
applicable in enforcement actions by the SEC.' Accordingly, we
reiterate our previous holding. . . that the SEC may seek other
than injunctive relief to effectuate the purposes of the federal se-
curities laws.
In sum, the second circuit held that the policies underlying the 1934
Act permit courts to grant all necessary relief. Courts have tradi-
tionally relied on this approach as their basis for granting ancillary
relief.
A second basis for granting ancillary relief is found in general
principles of equity jurisprudence, under which federal and state
courts may order any relief necessary to give effect to their injunc-
tive decrees.8 1 This approach is of limited utility since it is inapplic-
able where ancillary relief will not aid in effectuating the injunction
or where no injunction is issued.82 Finally, a properly framed man-
datory injunction can itself provide many forms of ancillary relief.
A few courts have adopted this approach." As with injunctive relief,
7, 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
11 Id. at 1103-04 (citations omitted); accord, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Radio Hill
Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-
08 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593,
598 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1021
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part, modified in part, 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. R.J. Allen
& Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (S.D. Fla. 1974); see SEC v. United Financial Group,
Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Barraco, 438 F.2d 97, 99 (10th Cir. 1971).
" See 1 J. PoMERoy, EQurrY JumsRuDCENcE § 171(1) (5th ed. 1941).
See note 94 and accompanying text infra.
See SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. American Inst.
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the decision whether ancillary relief should be granted is discretion-
ary with the court. It should be noted, however, that the second
circuit has held that all doubts as to the appropriateness of a rem-
edy are to be resolved in favor of the SEC once it proves a violation. 4
Courts have extended the rule that the SEC can obtain an
injunction without proving all the elements of a 10b-5 violation
required to be proven by a private litigant" to requests by the SEC
for ancillary relief. Thus, the SEC can obtain ancillary relief by
proving only those elements of a 10b-5 breach that it must show to
be granted an injunction." Of course, this showing is merely a prere-
quisite to a grant of ancillary relief; the court still may deny the
relief as a matter of discretion.
Ancillary relief must be remedial and cannot be penal." This
proposition is consistent with the design of injunctions to deter
rather than punish offenders. 8 Similarly, in a disgorgement pro-
ceeding, section 28(a) of the 1934 Act limits a defendant's liability
for damages to "actual damages." 9 None of this, however, precludes
ordering drastic measures 0 or limits the relief available in SEC
enforcement proceedings to what could be obtained in a private
action.9
The purpose of ancillary relief, as enunciated by the second
circuit, is to contribute "to the effective enforcement of the securi-
ties laws by depriving defendants of gains made through violations,
by deterring future violations, and by increasing the overall effi-
ciency of Rule 10b-5 and similar actions. 92 This last point - in-
creasing the efficiency of 10b-5 - undoubtedly refers to the simplic-
ity of having all issues determined in one suit and avoiding incon-
sistent results between an SEC injunction proceeding and a private
damage action.9
Counselors, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SaC. L. RF.P. (CCH) 95,388, at 98,963-
64 (D.D.C. 1975).
SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1973).
See JAcoBs, supra note 20, § 36 nn.17-23.
See id. § 15 nn.22-23.
" SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
RaP. (CCH) 95,388, at 98,964 (D.D.C. 1975).
' See JACOBS, supra note 20, § 260.04[c][i]; note 11 and accompanying text supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976); see JAcoBs, supra note 20, §§ 260.03[a], [el.
SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1973).
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 391 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
92 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
13 See Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule 10b-5, 79
HARv. L. Rav. 656, 661-65 (1966).
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Finally, since a court can grant ancillary relief in lieu of or in
addition to issuing an injunction,94 it can certainly order ancillary
relief whether the SEC is seeking a temporary restraining order, a
preliminary injunction or a permanent injunction. With this back-
ground, the particular forms of ancillary relief may now be exam-
ined.
1. Disgorgement
"Disgorgement" is a term of recent vintage which refers to suits
instituted by the SEC to deprive defendants of gains realized from
their 10b-5 breaches.9 5 Numerous courts have approved of disgorge-
ment as a proper form of relief in SEC actions." Although the term
is new, the concepts underlying disgorgement have been equated
with the traditional equitable remedies of restitution and recoup-
ment.97 Consequently, courts must be wary of the potential overlap
of recoveries from disgorgement and private damage actions di-
rected at the same violation. 8
Disgorgement orders have been justified on the grounds that
the purposes of the 1934 Act would be defeated if defendants were
able to retain their profit," and that disgorgement necessarily ren-
ders violations unprofitable. °0 Moreover, since disgorgement may
11 See, e.g., SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 599 (E.D. Pa. 1976); ef. United
States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951) (grant of restitution under Housing and Rent Act of 1947
although no injunction could issue).
'5 SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
" E.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (2d Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Penn
Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp.
1225, 1249 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem.
Sec., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part, modified in part, 574 F.2d
90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Western Pac. Gold & Silver Exch. Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REu. (CCH) 95,064, at 97,734 (D. Nev. 1975); SEC v. Capital Growth
Co., S.A., 391 F. Supp. 593, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
For a discussion of the overlap of recoveries when the SEC obtains disgorgement and
private litigants win damages under 10b-5, see JACOBS, supra note 20, § 260.03[h].
" See, e.g., SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1021 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd in part, modified in part, 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Jet Travel Servs.,
Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FEM. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,317, at 98,609 (M.D. Fla.
1975) (deterrence); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
*00 See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972);
SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 599 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem.
Sec., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part, modified in part, 574 F.2d
90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Jet Travel Servs., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
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be considered a form of mandatory injunction, at least some of the
factors courts weigh to determine whether to award the SEC an
injunction are also relevant to the court's decision.01
The most difficult question concerning disgorgement is deter-
mining the amount which the defendant must pay.'02 The SEC is
entitled to total, not partial, recovery from the defendant.'0 3 When
a defendant wrongfully buys shares on the basis of inside informa-
tion, courts have required him to disgorge the fair market value of
the stock after disclosure of this information, less the cost of the
shares to the defendant.'0 Subsequent market price movements of
the stock do not change this formula. Thus, the defendant cannot
reduce the amount he must disgorge if the market price falls after
its initial post-disclosure rise, even though he later sells at a lower
price.' 5 For example, if the defendant buys at $10, the stock's price
rises to $13 after disclosure, the market then drops, and the defen-
dant sells at $12, the defendant could be ordered to disgorge his $3
per share paper profit, even though he realized an actual profit of
only $2 per share. Hence, he bears the risk of a subsequent downturn
in the market. Of course, a court, in its discretion, may award to
the SEC only the defendant's actual profits. 0 On the other hand,
actual profits are not recoverable if the market continues to rise
REP. (CCH) 95,317, at 98,609 (M.D. Fla. 1975); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp.
866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974). See also JACOBS, supra note 20, § 6.
- The factors relating to injunctions which seem most applicable are the defendant's
past conduct, the nature of the prior violation, cessation of prior conduct, disclaimer of intent
to violate in the future, the defendant's opportunity to commit future violations, and whether
the defendant admitted his guilt.
02 In one case, the defendant sought to reduce the amount he was ordered to disgorge,
contending that since he had devoted his full time to the corporation responsible for the fraud,
he should not be liable to the same extent as defendants who reaped profits without real
personal effort. Rejecting this distinction, the court viewed the defendant's contention as
providing an additional ground for disgorgement. SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp.
1225, 1250 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977). It is suggested that the
defendant in that case was attempting to analogize his particular circumstances to private
damage actions wherein a defendant may escape liability for windfall damages to the extent
that the security's appreciation after the fraudulent purchase results from his special efforts.
See JACOBS, supra note 20, § 260.03[c][vi] n.13.
10 See SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 599 (E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Petrofunds,
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 958, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
-04 E.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
105 SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974); see SEC v. Commonwealth Chem.
Sec., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part, modified in part, 574 F.2d
90 (2d Cir. 1978).
- E.g., SEC v. Blatt, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FaD. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,281,
at 98,444 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
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after the date of disclosure and the defendant sells at a price higher
than the price on that date.' 7 For instance, if the defendant buys
at $10, the stock's price rises to $13 after disclosure, the market
continues to appreciate, and the defendant ultimately sells at $15,
the SEC can obtain $3 per share but not $5 per share. It should be
noted, however, that an analogy to the windfall measure of damages
in private actions suggests that the entire $5 per share in the above
example should be disgorged."" Furthermore, a defendant need not
disgorge any amount if he surrenders the shares at his cost to the
corporation.' s0 A tipper can also be required to disgorge his tippees'profits.111
Disgorgement is also appropriate relief in the case of a defen-
dant who receives a stock option in violation of the Rule."' Upon
exercising the option, the defendant should be required to disgorge
the fair market value of the stock after disclosure of material infor-
mation less the price at which the option was exercised. Disgorge-
ment is proper although the corporation refused to let an optionee
exercise his option, due to a pending SEC action, at a time when
the stock price was quite high, and the stock price subsequently fell
by the time of the court's hearing." 2
There is little authority on the appropriateness of disgorgement
of defendants who sell while possessing unfavorable material inside
information. By analogy to the disgorgement of buyers, it would
appear that a defendant-seller may be ordered to disgorge the differ-
ence between the price at which he sold his shares and the fair
market value of the security after disclosure of the information."'
In addition to the base amount to be disgorged, courts can also
order defendants to disgorge interest on that amount."4 The rules
which have developed in private damage actions as to the rate at
which prejudgment interest is assessed, the principal amount on
which prejudgment interest is computed, and the period of time for
"I SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1005 (1971); see SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974) (dictum).
See JACOBS, supra note 20, § 260.03[c][vi].
,0 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 89 n.19, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). Of course, this provides
no fund for defrauded sellers. For a discussion of seller's rights, see JACOBS, supra note 20, §
260.03[h].
"I SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
' As to stock options and violations of the Rule, see JACOBS, supra note 20, § 116.03.
,,2 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 331 F. Supp. 671, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"1 See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104-05 (2d Cir. 1972).
"' Id.; see JACOBS, supra note 20, § 260.03[g].
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which prejudgment interest is allowed 15 should apply equally to
disgorgement suits brought by the SEC. Post-judgment interest
should also be permitted in disgorgement actions."6
A related issue is whether a court may order disgorgement of
profits plus the interest earned by the defendant on the illegal prof-
its. In other words, if a defendant fraudulently sells securities to his
victim for $1,000 cash, and subsequently invests that $1,000 in a
high yield bond which earns $200 during the period of time between
the fraud and the judgment, can a court order disgorgement of
$1,200, or is disgorgement limited to $1,000? The second circuit
addressed this question, and held that the SEC was entitled to the
base amount, but not to profits on the base amount or to the interest
the defendant earned thereon.1 7 The court drew support from the
fact that such profits and earned interest were not recoverable in a
private damage action, although it did not regard this argument as
determinative."" In a subsequent decision, however, the second cir-
cuit for the first time awarded windfall damages to a defrauded
buyer in a private damage action,"9 thus suggesting that such pro-
ceeds and earned interest are recoverable as well in disgorgement
proceedings. 2 " As a result, the SEC can now argue that it should be
entitled to disgorgement of the base amount ($1,000 in the example
above) plus profits and earned interest on the base amount ($200
in the example above). A court that orders disgorgement of these
profits and earned interest, however, should not award prejudgment
interest as well, because such an order would constitute double
recovery for the use of the base amount. 2' Whatever the proper
formula may be, a judge can order the defendants to divulge infor-
mation required for the computation of the amount to be dis-
gorged. 2 '
A final question arises concerning to whom the disgorged
amount should be paid. Courts often appoint a trustee'2 to distrib-
ute the disgorged funds to members of the public who have either
' JACOBS, supra note 20, § 260.03[g].
Id. § 260.03[g] & nn.37-38.
'1 SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104-05 (2d Cir. 1972). Even
though prejudgment interest can be obtained by the SEC, the defendant may have earned a
higher rate of interest on the money. The issue then becomes whether the SEC can recover
earned interest at the higher rate rather than at the rate for prejudgment interest. Id.
"' Id. at 1104.
' See JACOBS, supra note 20, § 260.03[c][vi] & nn.133-36.
" See id. § 260.03[c][vi] & n.137.
121 See id. § 260.03[g] & nn.22-29.
122 See notes 167-72 and accompanying text infra.
1 See notes 161-64 and accompanying text infra.
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purchased securities sold by the defendants or, alternatively, sold
securities bought by the defendant.'24 Where the defendants traded
in the over-the-counter market or on an exchange, the cases are in
disagreement with respect to whether the funds should be paid to
persons who were trading at about the same time as the defendants,
to those whose stock certificates can be matched with the defen-
dants' stock certificates by the transfer agent, or to those whose
trade was paired with the defendants' trade by the market maker
or the specialist. Similar questions arise in private damage ac-
tions. 25 The resolution of this issue in private damage actions
should be persuasive for disgorgement proceedings as well. Instead
of distributing the disgorged amounts to traders in the first in-
stance, the second circuit, for example, has approved of payment to
the corporation in an insider trading case. 2 1 Similarly, if the trustee
cannot find the traders entitled to the disgorged funds, courts have
ordered the remaining amounts paid to the corporation, 21 or held
in the court's registry until the traders claim the finds. 28 A court can
direct disposition of the unclaimed funds, even if it originally or-
dered that such funds be returned to the defendants.'2 '
2. Rescission
Rescission is the act of voiding a prior relationship. 3 The Su-
preme Court has indicated that a court can order rescission in an
SEC enforcement proceeding. 3' In addition, a defendant in an SEC
"I SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972), modifying 340 F. Supp. 913, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in
part, modified in part, 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Jet Travel Servs., Inc., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,317, at 98,609 (M.D. Fla. 1975); SEC v. Blatt,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,281, at 98,444 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
92,504, at 98,358 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
121 See JACOBS, supra note 20, § 62 nn.31-36 & 42-44 and accompanying text, §
260.03[c][vii][3].
"2 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
I" E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 93-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404.U.S. 1005 (1971).
E.g., SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
" Id. The trustee's expenses usually are borne by the defendant. See SEC v. Blatt,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,281, at 98,445 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,504, at 98,358 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"' See JACOBS supra note 20, § 260.03[c][vi].
m See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 462 (1969); accord, SEC v. Weisberger,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FmE. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,108, at 97,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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suit can be forced to offer rescission to defrauded public buyers,',
even if the market value of the securities received by the public from
the defendant then exceeds the market value of the securities which
the public surrendered.' 33
Although there is a dearth of written authority concerning the
factors a court should consider in determining whether to order
rescission or to require the defendant to offer rescission, it is sug-
gested that the controlling factors should be those used by courts
to decide whether to grant or deny disgorgement.' 34 This conclusion
is consistent with the policies of the 1934 Act, since both rescission
and disgorgement are remedies which render breaches of 10b-5 un-
profitable.
3. Appointment of a Receiver, Trustee or Special Agent
The appointment of a receiver is yet another type of ancillary
relief which the SEC can seek. A receiver is a person "specially
appointed" by a district court judge "to take control, custody, or
management" of a corporation or of property "that is involved in or
is likely to become involved in litigation," in order to preserve the
corporation's assets or the property.'3 5 Consistent with this broad
description, courts have charged receivers, appointed at the SEC's
behest,' 31 with a wide variety of duties, such as investigating and
making disclosures regarding specific topics,'37 filing reports with
the SEC,'3 8 amending reports previously filed by the corporation
with the SEC,' 39 disseminating reports to shareholders, " holding a
2 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), modifying SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1162
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Similarly, a court should have the power to order a defendant to offer
rescission to defrauded sellers. 480 F.2d at 390-91.
11 SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified sub
noma. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973).
13 See notes 95-101 and accompanying text supra.
,' 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2981, at 5 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
"I Among the cases approving the appointment of a receiver are: SEC v. Bull Inv. Group,
Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,010, at 97,522 (D. Mass.
1975); SEC v. Capital Growth Co., S.A. (Costa Rica), 391 F. Supp. 593, 598-99 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 878-79 (S.D. Fla. 1974); cases cited in
JACOBS, supra note 20, § 15 n.19; see also SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082,
1105 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510, 518 (2d Cir. 1970).
"7 SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972).
SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972).
,3' SEC v. Koenig, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,536, at
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shareholders meeting,' taking charge of a defendant's books and
records to prevent their destruction or alteration,4 2 making corpo-
rate books and records available to shareholders,' maintaining the
status quo, " and taking charge of a corporation, 4 5 even if it is
solvent. 4 ' Pursuant to federal law, a receiver is required to manage
and operate the property in his control according to the require-
ments of the law of the state where the property is located, in the
same manner as the owner would be bound to do. 47
Appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary, expensive, and
drastic remedy'4  which should not be granted lightly.' The SEC,
therefore, is sometimes reluctant to request a receiver. 5' When it
does, a trial judge has the discretion to approve or deny the re-
quest. 5' Judges will appoint a receiver when one is deemed to be
necessary to preserve the status quo5 2 or to prevent diversion or
waste of assets to the detriment of those for whose sake the SEC's
injunctive action was brought.153 In addition to these considerations,
courts have weighed a number of other factors in the exercise of their
discretion, such as the potentially harmful impact which the ap-
92,561 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972).
"I SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972).
'Id.
142 SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 870 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
" SEC v. Koenig, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. Stc. L. REP. (CCH) 93,536, at
92,561 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972).
"I SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972) (trustee); SEC
v. Heritage Trust Co., 402 F. Supp. 744, 751 (D. Ariz. 1975).
115 SEC v. Bowler, 427 F.2d 190, 196 (4th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475, 479
(8th Cir. 1970); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 750 (2d Cir. 1966); SEC v. Keller
Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1963); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC,
285 F.2d 162, 181-82 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); 12 WFmGHT &7MMLER,
supra note 135, § 2981, at 8.
2 "I SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Heritage Trust Co.,
402 F. Supp. 744, 753-54 (D. Ariz. 1975); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 878
(S.D. Fla. 1974).
'd' 28 U.S.C. § 959 (1976).
"s SEC v. Heritage Trust Co., 402 F. Supp. 744, 751 (D. Ariz. 1975); SEC v. Brigadoon
Scotch Distribs., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
"' SEC v. Heritage Trust Co., 402 F. Supp. 744, 751 (D. Ariz. 1975).
Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188,
1202-03 (1975).
5I SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 878 (S.D. Fla. 1974); see SEC v.
Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972).
12 SEC v. Koenig, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,536, at
92,561 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972); note 144 and accompanying text supra.
"I SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 878 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. Capital
Counselors, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 291, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (quoting SEC v. H.S. Simmons &
Co., 190 F. Supp. 432, 432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)); see SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp.
609, 619 (D.S.D. 1968).
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pointment of a receiver could have on the defendant's legitimate
activities,'54 whether the defendant's past actions indicate that he
cannot be relied upon to implement the court's decision, 1 5 the na-
ture of the defendant's fraud, the imminent danger that the prop-
erty involved will diminish in value, "' whether or not legal remedies
are adequate,'57 what a balancing of the equities suggests "' and the
SEC's chances of success on the merits. 9 In determining if a re-
ceiver is needed, courts may also employ those factors considered
in judging whether to grant or deny an injunction, 60 since appoint-
ing a receiver and granting an injunction are both extraordinary
remedies.
A receiver is indistinguishable in his functions, if not in his
name, from a trustee, a special counsel' and a special agent. A
trustee is most commonly appointed in cases where disgorgement of
profits has been ordered, and typically is instructed to find the
persons who traded with the defendants,6 2 and to distribute the
disgorged amounts to them.
Courts sometimes appoint a person whom they call a trustee
only to assign him to duties normally performed by a receiver. For
example, one court instructed a trustee to report on the true state
of the corporation and to help preserve the status quo.13 The label
affixed by a court to a person performing these functions should not
affect the standard of care to be observed by him or the factors to
be used by a court to determine whether or not the appointment is
proper. 14
A special agent also appears to be a receiver by another name.
For this reason, the rules governing receivers should apply as well
to special agents. 65 For instance, one court appointed a special
11 SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y 1976).
5 SEC v. Koenig, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,536, at
92,561 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972).
' 12 WRIoHT & MILLER, supra note 135, § 2983, at 22-23.
,$ Id. at 23.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
1' See text accompanying notes 2-77 supra.
"I Although expressing approval of the use of this tool in a proper private action, Judge
Duffy declined to appoint a special counsel in SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp.
477, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). A special counsel was part of
the relief granted in SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,388, at 98,963 (D.D.C. 1975).
,12 See notes 123-29 and accompanying text supra.
"s SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972).
"' See JACOBS, supra note 20, § 260.03[d].
See id. § 260.03[d].
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agent to ascertain and report the true facts about a corporation
when the corporation's management refused to do so in the face of
a court order. '
4. Reports and Accounting to the Court
In SEC enforcement actions, courts have orderd defendants to
submit to the court or to a court-appointed receiver reports which
detail certain information relating to the defendants' securities
trading or to securities held by the defendants. 6 ' Courts refer to this
remedy as filing a report"'8 or an accounting.169 These reports, which
a judge can require to be in affidavit form,17 have been held not to
violate the fifth amendment or to constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure.' Furthermore, a defendant cannot defeat this form of
ancillary relief by arguing that the 1934 Act's reporting require-
ments are exclusive.17 2
5. Freeze on the Defendant's Assets
District courts have temporarily frozen a defendant's assets as
a form of ancillary relief in enforcement actions.173 This order is most
often granted while the court is attempting to determine how much
the defendant must disgorge.17 Its purpose is to prevent the defen-
dant from dissipating, concealing, or disposing of his assets before
he disgorges his illegal profit. 175 Some freeze orders permit the defen-
dant to pay his living expenses out of his assets.'
Courts must carefully consider the facts before granting this
order because of its drastic nature.177 One court solicitously noted
that district judges should be wary of freezing a defendant's assets,
'" SEC v. Beisinger Indus. Corp., 421 F. Supp. 691, 696 (D. Mass. 1976), af'd, 552 F.2d
15 (1st Cir. 1977).
I" SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs.,
386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
" SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1973).
"' SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
I,0 SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913,936 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified,
458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
"I SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1973).
In Id. at 6.
I SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105-06 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v.
Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. R.J. Allen &
Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
"I SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v.
R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
"I SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" See, e.g., id.; SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 870 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
" SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105-06 (2d Cir. 1972).
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not because it would be a hardship to the defendant, but because
the freeze may destroy his business and leave him unable to pay his
victims.118
III. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES OF THE SEC
IN CONTESTED PROCEEDINGS
Rather than applying to a court for redress, the SEC may uti-
lize its statutory powers and impose remedies in an administrative,
quasi-judicial capacity. The most important grants of power are
found in sections 15(b)(4)' 7 and 15(b)(6)'80 of the 1934 Act, which
permit the SEC to censure, limit the activities of, suspend, or revoke
the registration of brokers, dealers and others. ' Sections 19(h)(2)18
and 19(h)(3) 83 of the Act also authorized the SEC to punish a mem-
ber of a national securities exchange if it violates the 1934 Act, or a
member of the NASD if it breaches the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act.' 4
The question of whether or not the SEC can disbar a professional
who appears before it is being litigated in the second circuit. The
Commission can issue a report of investigation, discipline the
NASD or a stock exchange, withdraw a security's registration under
the 1934 Act, and suspend trading in a security for 10 days.8 5 Sec-
tion 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 authorizes the SEC
to discipline investment advisers.'88 These administrative powers
will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
A. Disciplining Brokers, Dealers, and Persons Associated With
Them
Upon discovering a 10b-5 violation by a broker, dealer, or per-
son who is associated with a broker or a dealer, or by a person who
is seeking to become so associated, the SEC may pursue three
courses of action. It may request that the Department of Justice
institute a criminal action,' 7 it may commence a court proceeding
,"I Id. In § 21(e)(1) of the 1934 Act, Congress empowered the SEC to seek writs of
mandamus, injunctions, and orders commanding any person to comply with the 1934 Act and
the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976). This section,
however, is rarely utilized in the lob-5 context. See Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction
Suits for Violation of Rule lOb-5, 79 HARV. L. REV. 656, 660 (1966).
,7, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1976).
Id. § 78o(b)(6).
"' See text accompanying notes 187-277 infra.
,' 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(3).
"' See text accompanying notes 283-288 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 289-299 infra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1976); see notes 279-82 and accompanying text infra.
I See JACOBS, supra note 20, § 263.
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seeking to enjoin further violations, 's or it may institute administra-
ive disciplinary proceedings either at the time the breach is discov-
ered or after the defendant has been convicted or enjoined.'89
Sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) of the 1934 Act are the basis for
the SEC's authority to impose administrative discipline."' Due to
the similarity of their language, the sections will be treated together.
The SEC uses section 15(b)(4) to discipline a registered broker or
dealer. Section 15(b) (6) is employed to sanction a person associated
with a broker or dealer, or a person seeking to become so associated.
The term "person associated with a broker or dealer" is defined in
section 3(a)(18) of the 1934 Act as follows:
The term "person associated with a broker or dealer" or
"associated person of a broker or dealer" means any partner, offi-
cer, director, or branch manager or such broker or dealer (or any
person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions),
any person directly of indirectly controlling, controlled by, or
under common control with such broker or dealer, or any employee
of such broker or dealer, except that any person associated with a
broker or dealer whose functions are solely clerical or ministerial
shall not be included in the meaning of such term for purposes of
section [15(b) of the Exchange Act] (other than paragraph (6)
thereof)."'
Sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) pertain to a broad range of per-
sons. Registered brokers, registered dealers, and persons associated
with a broker or dealer are clearly within their ambit. Under section
15(b)(6), the SEC also can sanction someone who has never been a
broker, a dealer or a person associated with a broker or a dealer,"'
so long as that person is seeking to become associated with a broker
or dealer.
Section 15(b)(4) authorizes the SEC to "censure, place limita-
tions on the activities, functions, or operations of, suspend for a
period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the registration of
any broker or dealer .... "193 Section 15(b)(6) permits similar
sanctions against other persons by authorizing the SEC to "censure
or place limitations on the activities or functions of any person...
or suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months or bar any such
,5 See text accompanying notes 2-77 supra.
255 See notes 211-15 infra.
', 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4), (6) (1976).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(18) (1976).
23 Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968).
"1 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1976).
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person from being associated with a broker or dealer . . . . ,
Revoking the registration of a broker or a dealer under section
15(b)(4) and barring, as distinguished from suspending, an associa-
tion with a broker or a dealer pursuant to section 15(b)(6), are
sanctions of unlimited duration.195 A bar order apparently can pre-
clude association with all brokers and dealers, regardless of whether
they are required to register under section 15(a) of the 1934 Act."9
Pursuant to these powers, the SEC has imposed sanctions such as
censure,9 7 withdrawal of registration as a broker-dealer,' revoca-
tion of broker-dealer registration, 9 bar from any association with a
broker, dealer, or investment adviser,2"" or from association with a
broker or a dealer in a supervisory or proprietary capacity, 20 1 and
suspension of any association with a broker or dealer.21 2 Moreover,
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (1976).
"' Naftalin & Co., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-3277 (May 17, 1973) (decision
of Administrative Law Judge), reported in [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH)
79,379, at 83,110-11. This is not to say that a broker or dealer may not reapply for registra-
tion after a revocation. When the individual's reentry "would be consistent with the public
interest," reinstatement can be ordered. Id. at 83,111.
1" 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1976). Thus, it could apply to brokers and dealers whose business
is wholly intrastate or wholly on an exchange or which deal only in exempted securities,
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances or commercial bills. These types of brokers and
dealers are exempt from registration by § 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act.
17 Albert Teller & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,104 (Feb. 12, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET
1257.
11 Mississippi Valley Investment Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,683 (Aug. 2, 1976),
10 SEC DOCKET 168; Albert Teller & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,104 (Feb. 12, 1976),
8 SEC DOCKEr 1257.
'" Contemporary Securities Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 13,261 (Feb. 14, 1977), 11
SEC DOCKET 1721; A.J. White & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,614 (July 9, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 10; Kenneth Bove & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,567 (June 22, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 954; Scherl, Egener & Bassuk, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,156 (Mar. 2, 1976),
9 SEC DOCKET 45; Richard C. Spangler, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,104 (Feb. 12,
1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1257; King Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 11,939 (Dec. 18, 1975),
8 SEC DOCKET 755.
2 Gotham Securities, Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,956 (Nov. 5, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 899; Edward C. Jaegerman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,905 (Oct. 19, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 728; Willard G. Berge, Exchange Act Release No. 12,846 (Sept. 30, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 601; A.J. White & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,614 (July 9, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 10; C.R. Richmond & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,535 (June 10, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 846; Gilbert F. Tuffli, Exchange Act Release No. 12,534 (June 10, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 845; Richard C. Spangler, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,104 (Feb. 12, 1976), 8
SEC DocKET 1257.
"I Richard B. Berdahl, Exchange Act Release No. 13,139 (Jan. 6, 1977), 11 SEC DocKET
1361; Joseph S. Capkovic, Exchange Act Release No. 12,683 (Aug. 2, 1976), 10 SEC DocKET
168; Joseph Elkind, Exchange Act Release No. 12,485 (May 26, 1976), 9 SEC DocK=r 736.
292 Joseph S. Capkovic, Exchange Act Release No. 12,683 (Aug. 2, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET
168; Gilbert F. Tuffli, Exchange Act Release No. 12,534 (June 10, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 845;
Joseph Elkind, Exchange Act Release No. 12,485 (May 26, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr 736.
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the SEC has required offenders, in certain circumstances, to apply
to it for permission to become associated in the future with any
broker or dealer in a non-supervisory capacity;2"3 limited an of-
fender's activities as a broker, as a dealer or as a person associated
with any broker or dealer exclusively to the offer and sale at retail
or particular securities;2 °0 expelled offenders from membership in a
stock exchange0 5 and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD); 211 and barred them from being associated with a member
of any national securities exchange or registered securities associa-
tion.207
In addition to the sanctions ordered pursuant to these statu-
tory powers, the SEC occasionally has ordered the revocation of a
brokerage firm's registration unless the principal offender is disasso-
ciated from the firm. 2ss The SEC, however, cannot levy fines2 1 or
order respondents to pay their victims damages. 21
Section 15(b)(4) sets forth in considerable detail the grounds for
imposing sanctions. These grounds are incorporated into section
15(b)(6). Section 15(b)(4)(B) authorizes the SEC to impose sanc-
tions if the broker-dealer or any person associated with it was con-
victed, within 10 years prior to filing an application for registration
or at any time thereafter, among other things, of a crime (1) involv-
ing the purchase or the sale of any security; (2) arising out of "the
conduct of the business of a broker, dealer, municipal securities
dealer, investment adviser, bank, insurance company, or fidu-
ciary"; or (3) involving "the larceny, theft, robbery, extortion, forg-
ery, counterfeiting, fraudulent concealment, embezzlement, fraud-
ulent conversion, or misappropriation of funds, or securities. 2 1'
Section 15(b)(4)(C) allows the SEC to impose sanctions where
2 Richard B. Berdahl, Exchange Act Release No. 13,139 (Jan. 6, 1977), 11 SEC DocKEr
1361; Bruce William Zimmerman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,690 (Aug. 5, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKET 175.
2' Bruce William Zimmerman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,690 (Aug. 5, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKEr 175 (redeemable securities issued by registered investment companies).
2 First Western Securities Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,438 (Apr. 11, 1977), 11
SEC DOCKEr 2232.
214 Nassar & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,104 (Feb. 12, 1976), 8 SEC DocKET 1257.
2 First Western Securities Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,438 (Apr. 11, 1977), 11
SEC DOCKET 2232.
210 Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42 S.E.C. 811,853 (1965); M.S. Wein & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735,
754-56 (1946); E.H. Rollins & Sons, 18 S.E.C. 347, 390-94 (1945).
211 In contrast, stock exchanges and the NASD have the power to levy fines. 15 U.S.C. §
78o-3(b)(7) (1976).
20 The SEC sometimes obtains damages for injured parties when it settles, rather than
adjudicates, proceedings.
"1 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(B) (1976). Section 15(b)(4)(A) permits disciplinary action if the
broker-dealer willfully filed a misleading application for registration.
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the broker, dealer, or associated person is permanently or temporar-
ily enjoined from, among other things: (a) acting as an investment
adviser, underwriter, broker, or dealer; (b) engaging in or continuing
any conduct or practice in connection with any such activity; or (c)
engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection
with the purchase or the sale of any security. An injunction pro-
scribing infractions of 10b-5 clearly would be within the third of the
enumerated criteria of section 15(b)(4)(C) and, in addition, might
satisfy one or both of the others. The SEC can discipline a broker-
dealer even though the district court in the injunction proceeding
did not find the relevant violation to be willful.213 Nor can the re-
spondent successfully defend against the sanction by contending
that it did not violate or threaten to violate the injunction.2" In fact,
the broker cannot collaterally attack the injunction in the SEC's
disciplinary proceeding.2'5
Subsection (D) is the broadest of the section 15(b)(4) subdivi-
sions. It permits the SEC to discipline a broker-dealer who
"willfully" violates any provision of the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, '21 the Investment Company Act of
1940, '217 or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, or who is
unable to comply with any of these provisions.2 '8 The SEC, there-
fore, can censure, limit the activities of, suspend for up to twelve
months, or revoke the registration of a broker-dealer who willfully
breaches Rule 10b-5.219 The word "willfully" is not defined in the
1934 Act, although it appears in sections 6(b),22 1 9(e),22' 15(b)(4)(A),
15(b)(4)(D), 15(b)(4)(E), 15(b)(6), 15A(1) (2) (B),222 19(h)(2),2 23
19(h)(3),v 19(h)(4), 32(a),2 and 32(c)(2).22 A number of cases have
211 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(C) (1976).
"I Shuck v. SEC, 264 F.2d 358, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Light, Wofsey & Benesch, Inc., 27
S.E.C. 763, 765 n.5 (1948).
21, Frank P. Todd, 40 S.E.C. 303 (1960); J.D. Creger & Co., 39 S.E.C. 165, 170-71 (1959).
2" Gibbs & Co., 40 S.E.C. 963, 967-68 (1962); J.D. Creger & Co., 39 S.E.C. 165, 170
(1959); Kaye, Real & Co., 36 S.E.C. 373, 375-76 (1955); James F. Morrissey, 25 S.E.C. 372,
381 (1947).
2 2 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1976).
217 Id. §§ 80a-1 to -52.
228 Id. § 78o(b)(4)(D).
219 Id.
221 Id. § 78f(b); see JACOBS, supra note 20, §§ 3.02[a], 10.02.
22 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976); see JACOBS, supra note 20, § 3.02[c].
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4)(D), (E), (b)(6); 78o-3(1)(2)(B) (1976).
m Id. § 78s(h)(2); see text accompanying notes 283-88 infra.
2u 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(3), (4) (1976); see text accompanying notes 283-88 infra.
22 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976).
222 Id. § 78ff(c)(2). It is interesting to note that the word "willfully" does not appear in §
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construed the term willfully and its cognates. The present scope of
willful activity, however, must be viewed in light of the 1976 deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.221 In that
case, the Court held that intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud
is required in private damage actions brought under 10b-5.228 The
Court, however, specifically left open the question whether reckless-
ness will satisfy the scienter requirement in a private action.229 It
must be determined, therefore, if the definitions of willfulness
adopted by the Commission and the courts prior to 1976 remain
viable after Hochfelder and whether the post-Hochfelder cases
construing the term evidence a changed attitude.23°
The most popular pre-Hochfelder definition of willful in the
context of a SEC administrative proceeding was: "intentionally
committing the act which constitutes the violation. There [was] no
requirement that the actor also [have been] aware that he [was]
violating one of the Rules or Acts.' '23 Neither specific intent to
defraud, 22 evil intent,2 nor evil purpose234 was an ingredient of this
formulation. Courts fleshed out this definition by citing conduct
they deemed willful, such as disseminating an offering circular
15A(b)(7), which deals with violations by members of NASD or a stock exchange of those
organizations.
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
2 Id. at 212-15; see JACOBS, supra note 20, § 63.
2 425 U.S. at 193 n.12; see JACOBS, supra note 20, § 63. The second circuit recently has
held that proof of recklessness is sufficient to establish a violation of 10b-5 in a private
damage action. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 642 (1978) (mem.).
230 Aside from the problems flowing from Hochfelder, the particular statutory provision
in which the word willfully appears may also bear upon its interpretation. Thus, the term
may not have the same meaning in the criminal context of § 32(a) as it does in the administra-
tive milieu of §§ 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6). See JACOBS, supra note 20, § 7 n.1. The cases, however,
contain no nuance of such a distinction.
21 Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1975); accord, Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596
n.6 (2d Cir. 1969); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967); Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v.
SEC, 348 F.2d 798, 802 & n.15, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d
582, 588 (8th Cir. 1965); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969,977 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Underhill Securities Corp., 42 S.E.C. 689,
695-96 (1965); Hamilton Waters & Co., 42 S.E.C. 784, 791 n.14 (1965); Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 917 (1961); Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 659 (1961); MacRobbins
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 497, 505 n.22 (1961), remanded sub nom. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d
Cir. 1961) and Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961); Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C.
311, 339 & n.27 (1952), modified, 34 S.E.C. 593 (1953).
"I Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969).
Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 220-21 (9th Cir. 1969).
2 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Comment, SEC Enforcement of
the Rule 10b-5 Duty to Disclose Material Information - Remedies and the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Case, 65 MICH. L. Rav. 944, 961-62 n.92 (1967).
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known to be false,2 knowingly misrepresenting or being grossly
careless or indifferent with respect to the truth of facts repre-
sented,2 taking an action after the SEC has warned that the action
will violate the law,2s7 and deliberately ignoring that which one has
a duty to know and recklessly stating facts about matters of which
he is ignorant. These cases appear to adopt reckless or knowing
conduct as the standard for ascertaining willful behavior. Other
authorities expanded on the meaning of "intentionally committing
the act," and suggested that the respondent acted "intentionally"
if he was aware of what he was doing,2 9 or if the facts pointed to a
violation and he nevertheless had an intent to perform the violative
acts.20 After Hochfelder, reckless or knowing seems to remain the
standard by which willfulness is judged in SEC administrative pro-
ceedings.41
An issue which has not been fully analyzed by any court is the
relationship between willfulness in the administrative context and
the level of culpability needed to establish a 10b-5 breach in a
private damage action or an SEC enforcement action.242 Section
15(b)(4)(D) permits the SEC to sanction a respondent only if he
"willfully violated" 10b-5 or some other provision. Therefore, the
SEC must find that a specific provision of the securities laws was
2m Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 798, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
' Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967).
= Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also Alexander Smith, 22
S.E.C. 13, 19 (1946).
m' Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109
(2d Cir. 1967). Furthermore, neither an attorney's opinion, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42
S.E.C. 811, 821 (1965), nor approval of state securities officials, Associated Investors Securi-
ties, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 160, 169 (1962), necessarily negated willfulness.
21 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 917 (1961); Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C.
652, 659 (1961); MacRobbins & Co., 40 S.E.C. 497, 505 n.22 (1961), remanded sub nom. Kahn
v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961) and Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961); Van
Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311, 339 n.27 (1952); Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of See.,
64 N.J. 85, 91, 312 A.2d 497, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Case Comment, A New Concept of Fraud
on the Securities Exchange - A Comment on In re Cady Roberts & Co., 15 S.C. L. REV. 557,
568 n.37 (1963).
2,0 See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 298 n.43 (D.D.C.
1973); Associated Investors Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 160, 169 (1962). Moreover, the second cir-
cuit appeared willing to accept negligence as the touchstone for willfulness. Gross v. SEC,
418 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1969) (knew or should have known of illegal acts); Dlugash v. SEC,
373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967) (knew or should have known; later speaks of recklessness);
cf. S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (cannot willfully aid and abet if did not know
and had no reasonable cause to know).
211 Edward J. Mawood & Co. v. SEC, No. 77-1495 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 1979); Wasson v.
SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 887 (8th Cir. 1977); Investors Research Corp., Administrative Proceeding
File No. 3-4669 (initial decision of Administrative Law Judge) (July 19, 1976) (no change as
a result of Hochfelder).
212 See JACOBS, supra note 20, §§ 63, 118, 141.01.
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violated and that the -violation was willful. The requirement that
the violation be willful clearly creates an added burden on the SEC
when it seeks to sanction persons who breach provisions making
innocent conduct actionable, such as section 12(1) of the 1933 Act.73
On the other hand, where the SEC seeks to sanction offenders of
10b-5, the requirement that the violation be willful may or may not
present additional difficulty. Although proof of scienter is still re-
quired in private damage actions,4 it appears that, at least in some
circuits, negligence is now sufficient in SEC enforcement actions.4 5
Thus, to sanction an offender of 10b-5, the SEC will be required to
find a greater degree of culpability than is needed to make out a
violation of the Rule in an enforcement action. In this situation,
therefore, it may be less burdensome for the SEC to uphold the Act
by seeking a district court injunction than by utilizing its adminis-
trative powers against the broker-dealer.
Section 15(b)(4)(E) *of the 1934 Act"' permits the SEC to im-
pose sanctions upon a person who either (1) "willfully aided, abet-
ted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the violation by
any person of any provision" of the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of
1940, or the rules and regulations promulgated under any of those
statutes or (2) fails reasonably to supervise a person who commits
such a violation. It is apparent that the statute requires that the
aiding, abetting, or other conduct by the person to be disciplined
be willful. A literal reading of the section, however, does not man-
date that the primary violation itself be willful. Similarly, a literal
reading of section 15(b) (4) (E) does not require that either the failure
to supervise or the violation of law by the supervised person be
willful.W
Section 15(b)(6), as already noted, permits the SEC to impose
penalties on persons who are associated, or who are seeking to be-
11 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(1) (1976).
M4 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
25 See SEC v. Aaron, No. 77-6091, (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 1979); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co.,
No. 77-1768 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 1979); SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (1st
Cir. 1976); SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1976); cf. SEC v. Coven, 581
F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (Mar. 5, 1979) (§ 17(a)
enforcement action). But see SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v.
Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
246 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1976).
247 For a discussion of a broker-dealer's duty to reasonably supervise, see JACOBS, supra
note 20, § 214.02. Section 15(b)(4)(F) permits the SEC to impose sanctions if the broker-
dealer is subject to an order under § 15(b)(6) "barring or suspending the right of such person
to be associated with a broker or dealer."
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come associated, with a broker or a dealer.?A The grounds for order-
ing such sanctions are subsections (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) of
section 15(b)(4), discussed above.
Upon finding a ground for sanctioning a person under section
15(b)(4) or 15(b)(6),24 the SEC may impose any of the enumerated
sanctions which it finds to be in the public interest. In selecting the
proper sanction, the SEC has deemed the following factors to be
mitigating: that the offender had not previously been the subject of
a disciplinary action by the SEC,2 or of any other proceeding or
action brought by or on behalf of the SEC,2' had a good prior record
in the securities business for a substantial period of time, 2 had
voluntarily reported its financial problems at the earliest opportun-
ity and had taken every possible step to correct them,2s3 and had
ceased to engage in those transactions that were the subject of the
proceedings after a short period of time. 21 Other facts considered
significant were that: only one transaction was involved;2 5 the of-
fense was novel;25 the events giving rise to the proceedings were
initiated by other parties;257 the violative conduct represented the
respondent's first venture in the securities business;2 8 the conduct
subject to question was wholly managerial in nature;259 any profits
24 See notes 191-96 and accompanying text supra.
25 Where the sanction is severe, it has been held that the SEC must find a 10b-5 violation
based on clear and convincing evidence before it may discipline a person pursuant to §
15(b)(4) or 15(b)(6). Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This degree
of persuasion is much higher than "a mere preponderance of the evidence," but is less than
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
210 Dow Theory Letters, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 571 (Feb. 22, 1977),
11 SEC DocKEr 1855.
"' Morton Schimmel, Esq., Exchange Act Release No. 12,254 (March 25, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 262.
"I Gilbert F. Tuffli, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 12,534 (June 10, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
845; Steadman Securities Corp., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-3101 (Dec. 20, 1974)
(initial decision), reported in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 80,038,
at 84,867.
153 Edward C. Jaegerman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,905 (Oct. 19, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKEr 728.
" Olde & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,952 (Dec. 24, 1975), 8 SEC DOCKET 895.
" Gilbert F. Tuffli, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 12,534 (June 10, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET
845.
8 Black & Co., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-3460, (July 12, 1974) (initial deci-
sion), reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,921, at 84,389.
21 Olde & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,952 (Dec. 24, 1975), 8 SEC DocKEr 895.
211 Bruce William Zimmerman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,690 (Aug. 5, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 175.
211 Midland Securities Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 13,139 (Jan. 6, 1977), 11 SEC




realized in connection with the transactions which were the subject
of the proceeding were insubstantial " and no client appeared to
have suffered economic loss; " the offender himself suffered sub-
stantial financial losses; 2 the drop in the market price of the securi-
ties was "unforeseen and unforeseeable;" 2" the offender relied on
the advice of counsel2s or on his firm's investigative activities; " the
offender willingly let himself be used to further the schemes of oth-
ers;2" and the offender fully cooperated with the staff of the SEC in
connection with the investigation preceding the administrative pro-
ceedings.217 Certain preventive measures agreed to by the offender
which worked to mitigate the sanctions imposed by the SEC in-
cluded: the addition of a new procedure designed to ensure that
future transactions of the same nature will not escape detection,268
compliance with the undertakings specified in the broker-dealer's
offer of settlement,2 participation in a program of continuing edu-
cation, 7o and submission to a particular review of the offender's
operations.Y' Other corrective actions which have mitigated against
sanctions were an investment adviser's promise not to (i) recom-
mend the purchase of a security which it had purchased for its own
account within the preceding three months, or (ii) sell any security
for its own account if such security was previously recommended for
purchase by them unless a sell recommendation also was made to
the clients,272 and a broker-dealer's promise to make restitution or
280 Dow Theory Letters, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 571 (Feb. 22, 1977),
11 SEC DocKEr 1855.
"I Id.; Edward C. Jaegerman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,905 (Oct. 19, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKET 728.
212 Edward C. Jaegerman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,905 (Oct. 19, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 728.
23 Id.
218 First National Bank, Investment Company Act Release No. 7,859 (June 13, 1973), 1
SEC DocKEr 22, 22; D.F. Bernheimer & Co., 41 S.E.C. 358, 364 n.7 (1963); N. Pinsker & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 285, 289 (1960).
1" Gilbert F. Tuffli, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 12,534 (June 10, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
845.
2M8 Joseph Elkind, Exchange Act Release No. 12,485 (May 26, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 736.
"7 Dow Theory Letters, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 571 (Feb. 22, 1977),
11 SEC DOCKET 1855.
M Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,223 (Mar. 17,
1976); Thomson & McKinnon, 35 S.E.C. 451, 459-60 (1953).
z" Bache & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,958 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC DocKEr 898.
210 Rudolph, Paltz & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 191 (Mar. 30, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKEr 363.
" Id.
3 Dow Theory Letters, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 571 (Feb. 22, 1977),
11 SEC DOCKET 1855.
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a bona fide rescission offer.2 3
A person aggrieved by a final order of the SEC under either
section 15(b)(4) or 15(b)(6) can appeal to a federal circuit court of
appeals. 4 The SEC's findings of fact will be conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence.25 Since the SEC has discretion in ordering
what it believes is the proper sanction, a reviewing court will reverse
the sanction only if it finds a gross abuse of discretion. 6 A respon-
dent cannot successfully challenge a sanction on the ground that
others were less severely disciplined. 7
B. Disciplining Investment Advisers
In 1975, Congress amended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
with the result that sections 203(e) and 203(f)27 now correspond in
almost every respect to sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) of the 1934
Act. The obvious distinction is that the Investment Advisers Act
allows the SEC to discipline investment advisers, while the 1934 Act
permits the SEC to sanction brokers and dealers. It follows then
that the discussion of sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) applies as well
to sections 203(e) and 203(f).279
Among the sanctions which have been imposed upon invest-
ment advisers are: a bar from association with any investment ad-
viser,2s° revocation of investment adviser registration, 1 and perma-
nent prohibition "from serving or acting as an employee, officer,
director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser or depos-
itor of, or principal underwriter for, a registered investment com-
"3 Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42 S.E.C. 811, 852 (1965); A.M. Kidder & Co., 37 S.E.C.
58, 60 (1956); Irving N. Dennis, 34 S.E.C. 338, 341 n.5 (1952); Hammill & Co., 28 S.E.C. 634,
643 (1948); Ver Hulst & Co., 11 S.E.C. 310, 312-13 (1942).
'7' See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (1976).
=' See id. § 78y(a)(4). For cases construing this section, see Pierce v. SEC, 239 F.2d 160,
162 (9th Cir. 1956); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
11 See Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1965).
2 See Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967).
vs 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e), (f) (1976).
2" See text accompanying notes 187-277 supra.
1 Joseph P. D'Angelo, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 562 (Dec. 16, 1976), 11 SEC
DocKEr 1263; Sereco, S.A., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 546 (Oct. 21, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKEr 828; Charles H. Eldredge & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 541 (Oct. 4,
1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 684.
281 Sereco, S.A., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 546 (Oct. 21, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 828; Financial Management Corp., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 545 (Oct.
19, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 730; Charles H. Eldredge & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 541 (Oct. 4, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 684; C.R. Richmond & Co., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 520 (June 10, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 846; Scherl, Egener & Bassuk, Inc., Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 501 (Mar. 2, 1976), 9 SEC DocKer 45.
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pany or affiliated person of such investment adviser, depositor, or
principal underwriter .... "1
C. Disciplining Members of Self-Regulatory Agencies
Sections 19(h)(2) and 19(h)(3) of the 1934 Actn authorize the
SEC to discipline members, and persons associated with members,
of a national securities exchange of the NASD." In general, section
19(h)(2) permits the SEC, when such action is needed to protect
investors or in the public interest, to suspend for up to twelve
months or to expel a member from a national securities exchange
or from the NASD, if the member is subject to an order under
section 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act, 5 or if the member willfully violated
the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the
Investment Company Act of 1940, or any rule or regulation issued
under those statutes. 8  Section 19(h)(3) grants the SEC the same
authority over persons associated with a member of a national se-
curities exchange or of the NASD, except that the reference to an
order under section 15(b) is to one granted pursuant to subsection
(6) rather than subsection (4) of that section.87 The principles dis-
cussed regarding the SEC's power to discipline brokers, dealers, and
persons associated with brokers or dealers are applicable here as
well. 18 Thus, for example, the meaning of willfully, explored with
reference to brokers and dealers, should also govern sanctions under
sections 19(h)(2) and 19(h)(3).
D. Other SEC Administrative Remedies
The provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide several addi-
tional avenues for SEC action. Section 19(h)(1) of the 1934 Act
permits the Commission, if in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors, to suspend for up to 12 months, to revoke the
registration of, to censure, or to impose limitations on the activities
of a national securities exchange or the NASD if the Commission
finds that the exchange or the NASD has violated or is unable to
2 Financial Management Corp., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 545 (Oct 19,
1976), 10 SEC DocKgr 730, 731.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(h)(2), (3) (1976).
21 The statute speaks in terms of registered securities associations, but the NASD is
presently the only registered securities association.
2 For a discussion of § 15(b)(4), see text accompanying notes 187-277 supra.
2 15 U.S.C. 78s(h)(2) (1976).
15 U.S.C. 78s(h)(3) (1976).
2" See text accompanying notes 187-277 supra.
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comply with the 1934 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder.29
Pursuant to section 12(j) of the 1934 Act,20 the SEC can deny,
suspend the effective date of, suspend for up to 12 months, or revoke
the registration 1 of a security if the issuer failed to comply with any
provision of the 1934 Act or the rules and regulations thereunder. 2
Section 8(d) of the 1933 Act also permits the Commission to issue a
stop order suspending the effectiveness of a misleading registration
statement.23 Additionally, section 12(k) of the 1934 Act authorizes
the Commission, in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors, summarily to suspend trading in a security for a period of up
to 10 days;' 4 the Supreme Court, however, has prohibited the Com-
mission from tacking 10-day periods. 95 Section 21(a) of the 1934
Act 18 authorizes the Commission to investigate violations of the
1934 Act or the rules thereunder, and to publish a report of its
findings. This remedy is seldom used and has been criticized as
being ineffective. "
Finally, the SEC sometimes invokes Rule 2(e) of its Rules of
Practice.29 Under Rule 2(e), the privilege of practicing before the
Commission can, according to the Commission, be temporarily or
permanently denied to an attorney, accountant, engineer, or other
expert if, inter alia, (1) the SEC determines that he willfully vio-
lated 10b-5 or another provision of the securities laws, (2) a court
enjoined him from violating 10b-5 or another federal securities law
in an action brought by the SEC, or (3) the Commission in an
administrative proceeding or a court in a judicial proceeding deter-
mined that he violated 10b-5 or another federal securities law."' The
second circuit is presently considering the validity of Rule 2(e).
"1 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(i) (1976).
0o Id. § 781(j) (1976).
29 For a discussion of the registration of securities under § 12 of the Exchange Act, see
JACOBS, supra note 20, § 3.02[g] & nn.10 & 11.
2 See, e.g., Western Orbis Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,610 (June 9, 1977), 12 SEC
DocKEr 772.
"3 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1976).
2 Id. § 771(k) (1976).
29 SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 106 (1978).
21 Id. § 78u(a) (1976).
"7 See Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule 10b-5 Duty to Disclose Material Infor-
mation - Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MICH. L. Rxv. 944, 962 (1967).
299 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1977).
"I Id. An additional ground for temporary or permanent denial of the privilege of practic-
ing before the SEC is that the person has been disqualified by the state which licensed him
to practice. Id. Cases in which accountants have been permanently disqualified from appear-
ing or practicing before the Commission include E. Veon Scott, Accounting Series Release
No. 204 (Jan. 7, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKEr 1413; Phillip Shelby Merkatz, Accounting Series
Release No. 202 (Nov. 24, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 1019. Noteworthy among the cases perma-
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IV. REMEDIES BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
Fundamental to the effective functioning of a judicial or admin-
istrative system is the ability of the parties to achieve enforcement
of the law by agreement, thus eliminating the need for full-term
prosecution of every case. Accordingly, the SEC frequently settles
with defendants in court actions and respondents in administrative
proceedings. To the practitioner, therefore, knowledge of the reme-
dies which are available and have been acquiesced in by the SEC
in prior proceedings provides a most useful tool. The settlement in
a court case will take the form of a consent decree and, in some
cases, a court-approved undertaking2 °
For example, the SEC may agree to dismiss a court action
against a company if the company consents to the entry of a judg-
ment enjoining the company from further violations, and to an un-
dertaking to appoint two directors satisfactory to the SEC. In ad-
ministrative proceedings the settlement is simply evidenced by the
respondent's consent to the imposition of specified sanctions. Thus,
a brokerage firm may agree to suspend its operations for a stated
period of time."'
In addition to greasing the wheels of judicial expedience, termi-
nation of a court case or administrative proceeding by consent yields
advantages for both the SEC and the defendant-respondent. The
SEC has neither the manpower nor the budget to litigate all its
cases, and it obtains relief sooner than if the case were fully adjudi-
cated. The defendant-respondent reaps different advantages: litiga-
tion expenses are reduced; the disruption of business is reduced; the
possibility of harsher penalties is avoided; the SEC's discovery,
which might uncover information available for use against the
defendant-respondent in private actions arising out of the same
conduct, is limited or avoided; and the application of collateral
estoppel in subsequent private actions based on findings in the SEC
enforcement case is eliminated.0 2 Moreover, the defendant-
nently disqualifying attorneys from appearing or practicing before the Commission is Edward
C. Jaegerman, Exchange Act Release No. 13,513 (May 6, 1977), 12 SEC DocKET 372.
10 See SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., Litigation Release No. 8,426 (June 1, 1978), 14
SEC DOCKET 1275 (consent decree); SEC v. Union Planters Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,003 (W.D. Tenn. 1975) (undertaking).
"1 See Bache & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,958 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC DoCKEr
898.
U2 In Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979), the Supreme Court held
that collateral estoppel may be invoked in a private action to bar the defendant from relitigat-
ing'issues determined in an SEC enforcement trial, despite the loss of the right to a jury in
the SEC action. Id. Thus, a defendant is well-advised to avoid a trial in an enforcement action
where subsequent private damages actions are likely.
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
respondent can so consent without making any admissions or deni-
als of the SEC's allegations. If a prospective defendant or respon-
dent negotiates a settlement before the complaint is filed or the
administrative proceeding commenced, additional benefits may be
realized. Adverse publicity is kept to a minimum since the comm-
encement of the action (or the proceeding) and the settlement are
announced at the same time;3°3 the SEC's staff will not file an affi-
davit in court in support of a motion for a preliminary injunction
which may set forth troublesome facts; the SEC may be persuaded
to drop certain charges 4 and change the language of others; and the
offender may be able to negotiate with the SEC not to have certain
persons named as defendants.
The remainder of this section explores the remedies to which
defendants and respondents have consented. It is important to keep
in mind that these remedies are not necessarily available in con-
tested cases or proceedings .3 5 Additionally, a court will not grant
relief from a remedy to which a party consented merely because the
remedy could not have been imposed in a litigated case or proceed-
ing.3 3
A. Court Cases
The consent remedies which have been approved by courts vary
according to whether the defendant is a corporation or an individ-
ual. When the defendant is a corporation, the remedies include
monetary payments, special corporate procedures designed to pre-
vent future violations, and replacement in whole or in part of exist-
ing management. Monetary payments and limitations on the defen-
dant's activities have been awarded when the defendant is other
than a corporation. A temporary restraining order,317 preliminary
injunction"0 8 or permanent injunction"9 also are available to inhibit
See, e.g., SEC v. Ranchers Packing Corp., Litigation Release No. 8,240 (Jan. 4, 1978),
13 SEC DOCKET 1330.
3 See, e.g., SEC v. R.D. Philpot Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 8,239 (Dec. 30,
1977), 13 SEC DOCKET 1329.
See notes 2-299 and accompanying text supra.
See Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1188, 1193 & n.38 (1975).
1* See, e.g., SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., Litigation Release No. 8,316 (Mar. 13,
1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 496; Omega Financial Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,687 (Dec.
7, 1976), 11 SEC DOCKET 1157; SEC v. Institutional Sec., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,601
(Oct. 5, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 686; SEC v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., Litigation Release No.
7,576 (Sept. 21, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 543.
1 See, e.g., SEC v. Ginter, Litigation Release No. 7,730 (Jan. 6, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET
1403; SEC v. J. Tex Petroleum Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,575 (Sept. 21, 1976), 10 SEC
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the future conduct of any defendant. Some of these remedies are
also available in litigated SEC cases.310
1. Corporations
Monetary disgorgement of a corporate defendant is the most
common form of relief in contested court actions 1  and in those
terminated by a consent decree. The distinct advantage of disgorge-
ment by consent is that the corporate defendant is able to negotiate
the amount to be disgorged, whereas the court in a contested case
will order disgorgement of the entire profits. Disgorgement pursuant
to an agreement between the SEC and a corporation may take var-
ious forms in court cases. The simplest disgorgement orders have
required the payment of a sum of money in restitution, 312 payment
to persons who sold shares to the defendant, 13 payment of a speci-
fied sum of money to a former limited partner,31' and payment of
all proceeds realized by virtue of defendant's sales to the public.315
Substitutionary forms of disgorgement have included voiding the
conversion of defendant's Class A stock into common stock,316 void-
DocKET 542; SEC v. Reclamation Dist. No. 2090, Litigation Release No. 7,547 (Sept. 2, 1976),
10 SEC Doc=r 401; SEC v. American Petroleum, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,485 (July
8, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 1077; SEC v. Dal-Tex Petroleum Corp., Litigation Release No.
7,260 (Feb. 4, 1976), 8 SEC Doc=ET 1227; SEC v. Continental Gold & Silver Corp., Litiga-
tion Release No. 7,250 (Jan. 26, 1976), 8 SEC DocKrr 1177.
21 See, e.g., SEC v. International Postal Sys., Inc., Litigation Release No. 8,373 (Apr.
14, 1978), 14 SEC DocKET 856; SEC v. Five Star Coal Co., Litigation Release No. 8,319 (Mar.
13, 1978), 14 SEC DocKn 497; SEC v. Intercontinental Diversified Corp., Litigation Release
No. 8,245 (Jan. 6, 1978), 13 SEC DocKET 1376; SEC v. General Oil, Inc., Litigation Release
No. 8,165 (Oct. 21, 1977), 13 SEC Docnr 502; SEC v. Continental Gold & Silver Corp.,
Litigation Release No. 7,223 (Dec. 30, 1975), 8 SEC Docmer 953; SEC v. Empire Properties,
Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,219 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC Doc=nr 951; SEC v. Generics Corp.,
Litigation Release No. 7,218 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC DocKr 951; SEC v. Arnold Nelson,
Litigation Release No. 7,215 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC DociKr 949.
"I See notes 2-178 and accompanying text supra.
3" See notes 95-129 and accompanying text supra.
312 SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., Litigation Release No. 8,426 (June 1, 1978), 14 SEC
DocKET 1275 ($1.24 million); SEC v. Weston Int'l Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,378 (April
29, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 537 ($1 million).
3'3 SEC v. Blue Chip Stamps, Litigation Release No. 7,437 (June 9, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET
867 ($298,000).
3" SEC v. Goodman Sec. Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,567 (Sept. 17, 1976), 10 SEC
DoCK=T 540.
3,5 SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., Ltd., Litigation Release No. 7,244 (Jan. 19, 1976),
8 SEC DocET 1136; accord, SEC v. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l, S.A., Litigation
Release No. 8,336 (Mar. 20, 1978), 14 SEC DocKEr 579; SEC v. Five Star Coal Co., Litigation
Release No. 8,319 (Mar. 13, 1978), 14 SEC DoC=nr 497; SEC v. First Liberty Corp., Litigation
Release No. 8,268 (Jan. 23, 1978), 14 SEC Doc=cr 61.
314 SEC v. PRF Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,408 (May 24, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 753.
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ing the approval by shareholders of a plan to purchase common
stock," 7 and offering rescission rights to those who tendered shares
in response to a cash tender offer.38 Other methods of substantive
disgorgement which have been consented to require the defendant
to place in an escrow account the proceeds from any future sales of
its securities and not to withdraw those proceeds prior to the issu-
ance of stock certificates to the purchasers thereof,319 to assign a
percentage of its cash flow from future land sales in its real estate
development toa trustee to be held for the benefit of note purcha-
sers, 310 to phase in a rescission of the franchise purchase price to
franchise owners who elect to withdraw, '1 and to modify a trust
agreement with one of the limited partners. 22
In addition to the substantive aspect of disgorgement orders,
certain supplemental action is often agreed upon to assure compli-
ance with the decree. Thus, consent decrees have called for the
defendant to freeze its assets except for the purpose of complying
with the court's restitution order,3  to freeze the assets in the ac-
counts on deposit with it of certain of the other defendants in the
action, 2 to maintain a letter of credit,31 and to appoint an accoun-
tant to render an accounting.3 8 Consent orders have also provided
for the filing of a report prepared by certified public accountants
concerning claims recovered, approved and paid;32 for the publish-
ing of an appropriate notice of final judgment with written notice
317 Id.
-11 SEC v. Kodiak Indus., Litigation Release No. 7,622 (Oct. 28, 1976), 10 SEC DocKer
831; accord, SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., Litigation Release No. 8,410 (May 15,
1978), 14 SEC DocKEr 1155; SEC v. Taylor Realty Enterprises, Inc., Litigation Release No.
8,190 (Nov. 10, 1977), 13 SEC DocKEr 755.
"I SEC v. Timkin, C.A., Litigation Release No. 7,532 (Aug. 24, 1976), 10 SEC DoCKEr
309.
SEC v. Empire Properties, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,219 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC
DocKEr 951.
*1 SEC v. Futuristic Foods, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,407 (May 21, 1976), 9 SEC
DocKEr 752.
m SEC v. Goodman Sec. Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,567 (Sept. 17, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKEr 540.
" SEC v. Weston Int'l Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,378 (Apr. 29, 1976), 9 SEC
DocKr 537; see SEC v. Galaxy Inv. Advisory Serv., Inc., Litigation Release No. 8,264 (Jan.
23, 1978), 14 SEC DocKEr 59.
u' SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,475 (July 1, 1976),
9 SEC DocKET 1011.
= Id.
In SEC v. General Financial Servs., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,503 (July 23, 1976),
10 SEC Doca-r 138; accord, SEC v. Potomac Inv. Advisors, Ltd., Litigation Release No.
8,408 (May 10, 1978), 14 SEC DocxaT 1076.
12 SEC v. Blue Chip Stamps, Litigation Release No. 7,437 (June 9, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
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to each seller; 3r and for an undertaking by the defendant not to
assert any defense or claim based upon any statute of limitations
in any action commenced by specified private parties.2 9
Since many 10b-5 violations occur as the result of a lack of
concrete guidelines for the conduct of the corporation's activities,
consent decrees frequently require a corporation to establish rules,
regulations and policies. Defendants have agreed to "adopt, imple-
ment and maintain procedures reasonably calculated to prevent the
recurrence of the activities alleged" in the complaint,33 to prepare
guidelines for investment and trading policies, 31 to "implement and
maintain practices and procedures designed to prevent further vio-
lations of Regulation U," 332 and to "adopt, within 60 days, imple-
ment and maintain a Statement of Policies and Procedures with
respect to payments to any official or employee of any government
unlawful under the laws of the United States or any foreign coun-
try.' ' 3 Similarly, defendants have undertaken to educate employ-
ees to prevent recurrence of prohibited activity. Thus, a training
program for the investment division personnel of a defendant corpo-
ration has been established,334 while other defendants have agreed
to circulate accounting policies and requirements33s and "to insure
that their officers and employees become and remain fully educated
with respect to the requirements [of certain SEC regulations]. ' '331
Courts often issue consent decrees under which a defendant
agrees to refrain from engaging in certain activity. Specifically, cor-
porations have been prohibited "from engaging in any business ac-
= Id.; cf. SEC v. Unilith Enterprises, Inc., Litigation Release No. 8,265 (Jan. 23, 1978),
14 SEC DocKEr 59; SEC v. Randell, Litigation Release No. 8,251 (Jan. 11, 1978), 13 SEC
DocKn 1379.
3" SEC v. American Financial Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,545 (Sept. 1, 1976), 10
SEC DocKET 399.
"I SEC v. Royal Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,651 (Nov. 16, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKET 981; SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,475 (July 1,
1976), 9 SEC DocK r 1011; SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, summarized in [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH) 95,274, at 98,394 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
ml SEC v. Union Planters Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,003, at 97,477 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
3 SEC v. Bank of California, Litigation Release No. 7,906 (May 5, 1977), 12 SEC
DocKET 338.
2 SEC v. United Brands Co., Litigation Release No. 7,251 (Jan. 27, 1976), 8 SEC
DocKEr 1177, 1178.
*" SEC v. Union Planters Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,003, at 97,477 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
= Id.
m SEC v. United Americas Bank, Litigation Release No. 7,799 (Feb. 28, 1977), 11 SEC
DocKEr 1914.
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tivities with certain of the entities named" in the complaint;137 from
acquiring certain businesses unless their financial statements are
accurate;33s "from making any agreement, commitment or under-
standing. . . to make. . . any unlawful material payment of cor-
porate funds or other value, directly or indirectly, to or for the
benefit of any official or employee of any entity owned and/or con-
trolled by any foreign government; ' 39 and "from using or aiding and
abetting the use of corporate funds. . . for unlawful political contri-
butions, or other similar unlawful purposes. ' ' 34 ° Another area in
which special corporate procedures have been required is record-
keeping. Defendants have been enjoined, by consent, "from making
or causing to be made, materially false or fictitious entries on
[their] books and records, requiring the maintenance of adequate
documents with respect to any unlawful payments to officials or
employees of any foreign government and any unlawful political
contribution." 341
Review of certain corporate activity by senior corporate officers,
independent professionals or the SEC is another special procedure
contained in numerous consent agreements. Thus, courts have man-
dated annual review of the operations of the corporation's invest-
ment department to insure compliance with the applicable law, 3 2
the appointment of an independent accountant to audit prior years'
financial statements,343 the establishment of a committee of direc-
tors to review financial statements and press releases, 34' the appoint-
131 SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,475 (July 1, 1976),
9 SEC DoCKEr 1011.
3 SEC v. Lum's, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,504,
at 95,764 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); accord, SEC v. American Financial Corp., Litigation Release No.
7,545 (Sept. 1, 1976), 10 SEC DocKEr 399; SEC v. Levitz Furniture Corp., [1972-1973 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,510, at 92,481 (D.D.C. 1972).
33 SEC v. Uniroyal, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,759 (Jan. 27, 1977), 11 SEC DocKEr
1581, 1582.
-0 Id.; SEC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Litigation Release No. 7,386 (May 10, 1976),
9 SEC DocKEr 664, 664.
"I SEC v. United Brands Co., Litigation Release No. 7,251 (Jan. 27, 1976), 8 SEC
DOCKEr 1177; accord, SEC v. Uniroyal, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,759 (Jan. 27, 1977), 11
SEC DOCKEr 1581; SEC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Litigation Release No. 7,443 (June
15, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 920; SEC v. General Tire & Rubber Co., Litigation Release No. 7,386
(May 10, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr 664.
"2 SEC v. Union Planters Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,003, at 97,477 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
3 SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SaC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,917, at 93,675 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
31 SEC v. Mattel, Inc., summarized in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,754, at 96,486 (D.D.C. 1974).
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ment of special counsel to review corporate publicity,345 and the
appointment of special counsel to ensure compliance with the con-
sent decree3 5
Consent decrees and related undertakings in court cases
abound with requirements for reports to shareholders, for filing re-
ports with the SEC and for amending or correcting such reports.
Settlements have provided for the issuance of an annual report prior
to each annual shareholders' meeting containinginformation in con-
formity with various provisions of the proxy rules347 and issuance to
shareholders of a summary report of the corporation's operations.3 48
Many defendants agree, with respect to filing, to do that which the
securities laws already require them to do, while others take on new
reporting burdens. In the latter category, defendants have been re-
quired to provide periodic financial reports to present and prospec-
tive franchises and to the Commission,3 49 and to institute financial
reporting requirements. 35° In the former category, defendants have
consented to make filings with the Commission which are complete
and accurate in all material respects, 35' to file Schedule 13D's with
the Commission with respect to any acquisition of five percent or
more of any equity security registered with the Commission pur-
suant to section 12 of the Exchange Act,"2 and "to file. . . Sched-
ule 14D's with respect to any solicitation or recommendation...
to . . . shareholders to accept or to reject a tender offer or request
or invitation for tenders. '"3 53 Other defendants have agreed to amend
the relevant quarterly and annual reports filed with the Commis-
sion,311 to amend prior reports which were misleading, 5 to "amend
m SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., summarized in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 94,720, at 96,380 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
31 SEC v. Holiday Magic, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,526, at 95,818, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
31 SEC v. Readex Elec. Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,916 (May 11, 1977), 12 SEC
DOCKET 418.
'" Id.; cf. SEC v. Union Planters Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,003, at 97,478 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., summarized
in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,720, at 96,380 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" SEC v. Futuristic Foods, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,407 (May 21, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 752.
SEC v. Weston Int'l Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,378 (Apr. 29, 1976), 9 SEC
DocKET 537.
211 SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,917, at 93,676 (C.D. Cal. 1973); SEC v. Timkin, C.A., Litigation Release No. 7,532 (Aug.
24, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 309.
332 SEC v. Milgo Elec. Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,771 (Feb. 7, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET
1110.
= Id.
3u SEC v. American Financial Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,545 (Sept. 1, 1976), 10
SEC DOCKET 399.
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. . . Schedule 14D's filed with the Commission and to correct its
statements to shareholders to assure that such filings and state-
ments are complete and accurate and otherwise comply with the
securities laws," ' to "amend . . . Schedule 14D filed with the
Commission to reflect the institution of the Commission's action,
the substance of the allegations in the complaint, and the relief
entered by the Court,"" 7 and to "correct and amend annual and
other periodic reports currently on file with the Commission in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the federal securities laws with re-
spect to unlawful payments to officials and employees of foreign
governments and unlawful foreign political contributions by
[the defendant]. '"58
Miscellaneous special procedures to which corporate defen-
dants have consented include establishing and maintaining an
"accounting reserve . . . against payment of any judgment in a
legal proceeding brought. . . by reason of the manipulation,"3 the
appointment of a U.S. agent for the purpose of enforcing judg-
ment,3" appointment of a special counsel to file reports the corpora-
tion does not,36' making certain corrected filings with the Commis-
sion and distributing them to shareholders, 3 1 making certain disclo-
sures if a gambling casino is acquired, 363 and informing the SEC of
how the consent decree is being implemented.3 64
The final category of sanctions which may be found in a consent
decree or in the related undertaking by a corporation in a court case
is the partial or complete replacement of a corporation's manage-
'1 SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., summarized in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 94,720, at 96,380 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
SEC v. Royal Indus. Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,651 (Nov. 16, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 981.
17 SEC v. Milgo Elec. Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,771 (Feb. 7, 1977), 11 SEC DoCKET
1110.
SEC v. United Brands Co., Litigation Release No. 7,251 (Jan. 27, 1976), 8 SEC
DocKErr 1177.
"' SEC v. American Financial Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,545 (Sept. 1, 1976), 10
SEC DOCKET 399.
380 SEC v. OSEC Petroleum, S.A., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,915, at 97,134 (D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., summarized in
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,720, at 96,380 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
30 SEC v. Equity Funding Corp. of America, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 93,917, at 93,674-75 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
34 SEC v. Kodiak Indus., Litigation Release No. 7,622 (Oct. 28, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET
831.
,3 SEC v. Lum's, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,504,
at 95,763-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
31, SEC v. Levitz Furniture Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1I 93,510, at 92,481 (D.D.C. 1972).
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ment. The traditional remedies in this category have ranged from
simple replacement of a single corporate officer 35 to the appoint-
ment of a receiver with wide-ranging powers to control and operate
a corporation. 66 In recent years, however, the judiciary and the
Commission have, with increasing frequency, fashioned or approved
measures which decrease interference with a corporation's manage-
ment while assuring compliance with the securities law which has
been allegedly violated. Thus, remedies now include establishing
various corporate committees or positions to oversee activity which
is the subject of the underlying allegations, while leaving existing
management intact." ' Such action may integrate impartial person-
nel into new positions in the corporate hierarchy38 or simply require
the use of an independent source of advice and counselling.3 ' A
review of particular consent decrees and related undertakings ap-
proved by the courts illustrates this trend and demonstrates the
variety of solutions acceptable to the SEC and the courts.
The most drastic of the traditional provisions have required the
appointment of a receiver, ' conservator, 3' or special master;3 2 the
replacement of a temporary receiver by an independent board of
trustees and special counsel; 33 a reconstituted board of trustees to
include a majority of independent trustees; 34 the appointment of a
38 SEC v. TDA Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,369 (Apr. 23, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET
534.
we SEC v. Key Energy Corp., Litigation Release No. 8,392 (Apr. 27, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 960.
3" See SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH)
1 95,420, at 99,141 (D.D.C. 1976); SEC v. Holiday Magic, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,526, at 95,818-19 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
See SEC v. Citizens & S. Realty Investors, Litigation Release No. 8,379 (Apr. 21,
1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 953.
M See SEC v. Manivest Corp., Litigation Release No. 8,393 (May 1, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 1028.
370 SEC v. Key Energy Corp., Litigation Release No. 8,392 (Apr. 27, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 960; SEC v. Charles A. Stephens Co., Litigation Release No. 7,968 (June 10, 1977),
12 SEC DOCKET 892; SEC v. Independence Drilling Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,613 (Oct.
20, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 774; SEC v. Landahl, Brown & Week Assocs., Litigation Release
No. 7,330 (Mar. 25, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 294; SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., Ltd.,
Litigation Release No. 7,244 (Jan. 19, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1136; accord, SEC v. Wencke,
Litigation Release No. 7,757 (Jan. 25, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET 1580.
37 SEC v. Lyons Oil Co., Litigation Release No. 7,645 (Nov. 12, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET
978.
SEC v. Wenke, Litigation Release No. 7,741 (Jan. 18, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET 1542.
m SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Assoc., Litigation Release No. 7,450 (June 16, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 923.
rn SEC v. Citizens & S. Realty Investors, Litigation Release No. 8,379 (Apr. 21, 1978),
14 SEC DOCKET 953; accord, SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., summarized in [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,720, at 96,380 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see SEC v.
Generics Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,224 (Jan. 2, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1004.
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new interim board of directors; 7 5 and the appointment of a new
chief executive officer." 6 In fashioning more moderate sanctions,
corporate counsels, the SEC and the courts have frequently agreed
to the continued existence or establishment of integrated or inde-
pendent regulatory-like positions such as an audit committee, 7 a
management committee with responsibility for the corporation's
investment division,7 a special counsel to attend and call board
meetings,379 a special counsel to decide when the corporation should
file a petition in bankruptcy,38 ° an independent trustee to imple-
ment purchases for all employee stock plans, ' a special committee
of the board to investigate and report on matters contained in the
SEC's complaint and other matters,82 a litigation and claims com-
mittee to work with court-appointed special counsel,3 a special
agent to investigate the conversion or purchase of any stock,384 a
special counsel to bring suits, 3 5 and a committee of directors to
"I SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH)
93,917, at 93,675 (C.D. Cal. 1973); see International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334,
1339-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). Some settlements have called for the
appointment of additional directors. See SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, summarized in
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,274, at 98,394 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
SEC v. Mattel, Inc., summarized in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,754, at 96,486 (D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. TDA Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,369 (Apr.
23, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 534.
'' SEC v. TDA Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,369 (Apr. 23, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
534.
31t See SEC v. National Bank, Litigation Release No. 8,395 (May 3, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 1029; SEC v. Manivest Corp., Litigation Release No. 8,393 (May 1, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 1028; SEC v. American Elec. Power Co., Litigation Release No. 8,310 (Mar. 3, 1978),
14 SEC DOCKET 416; cf. SEC v. Martin, Litigation Release No. 8,624 (Dec. 21, 1978), 16 SEC
DOCKET 582 (engage independent CPA "to conduct an annual limited audit to assess the
integrity of investors' interest").
"I, SEC v. Union Planters Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,003, at 97,477-78 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
31' SEC v. Holiday Magic, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rap. (CCH)
94,526, at 95,819 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
31 Id. at 95,821-22.
13 SEC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,214 (Dec. 23, 1975), 8 SEC
DOCKET 803.
3 SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,420, at 99,141 (D.D.C. 1976); SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,355
(Apr. 13, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 445.
u3 SEC v. Central & S.W. Corp., Litigation Release No. 8,358 (Apr. 3, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 690; SEC v. Generics Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,224 (Jan. 2, 1976), 8 SEC
DOCKET 1004.
-1 SEC v. PRF Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,408 (May 24, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 753;
accord, SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,420, at 99,141-42 (D.D.C. 1976).
3m SEC v. Holiday Magic, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,526, at 95,818-19 (N.D. Cal. 1974); SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., [1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,917, at 93,674-75 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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determine the proper disposition of claims against former directors
and officers. 8 Recent consent decrees addressing corporate man-
agement have also called for the formation of a new executive com-
mittee of the corporation's board of directors,1 7 a prohibition on the
conversion or purchase of stock unless the matter is submitted to
shareholders and a majority approve,3  a prohibition on the use of
external advisers,389 the voiding of proxies for the shareholders meet-
ing,39 the voiding of actions taken pursuant to proxies at the share-
holders meeting,"' a moratorium on the declaration of dividends
until a judgment is satisfied,392 a prohibition on expansion of the
corporation's business,393 and the filing of a chapter X bankruptcy
reorganization petition.394
2. Individuals
The second class of remedies available through consent decrees
and related undertakings in court cases concerns individuals who
have allegedly violated 10b-5. These sanctions can be conveniently
divided into disgorgement and limitations on activities. The latter
category can be subdivided into those limitations which relate to
management or voting and those that do not.
The most common form of disgorgement by consent requires
the defendant to relinquish that which he has gained. Thus, defen-
dants have agreed to pay a sum of money into court,3 5 to pay a sum
of money in restitution,"'s to reimburse and account for all transac-
I"SEC v. Mattel, Inc., summarized in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,754, at 96,486 (D.D.C. 1974).
37 SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, summarized in [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FEU.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,274, at 98,394 (S.D. Fla. 1975); SEC v. Levitz Furniture Corp.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,510, at 92,481 (D.D.C. 1972).
- SEC v. PRF Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,408 (May 24, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 753.
SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, summarized in [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 95,274, at 98,394 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
I" SEC v. Florida E. Coast Ry., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FAD. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,418, at 95,428 (D.D.C. 1974).
! Id.
"'SEC v. Holiday Magic., Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,526, at 95,821 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
n3 Id.
" SEC v. Oil Field Drilling Corp., Litigation Release No. 4,577 (Apr. 1, 1970).
SEC v. Cosmopolitan Investors Funding Co., Litigation Release No. 7,366 (Apr. 23,
1976), 9 SEC DocKET 533 ($10,000); SEC v. OSEC Petroleum, S.A., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,915, at 97,133 (D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Rusco Indus.,
Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 93,144, at 91,129 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
" SEC v. Cosmopolitan Investors Funding Co., Litigation Release No. 8,419 (May 24,
1978), 14 SEC DocKET 1217; SEC v. An-Car Oil Co., Litigation Release No. 7,885 (Apr. 21,
19791
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:397
tions in question,"7 to "pay a specified sum of money to former
limited partners, ' '31 to "disgorge all proceeds realized by virtue of
sales to the public of investments," ' to disgorge a sum of money
a'd "post collateral satisfactory to the [SEC] to secure their pay-
ments,"4°° to pay monies not repaid on the corporation's loan, 01 and
to reimburse the corporation for the difference between cost and
either sales price or appraised value. 02 In addition to monetary dis-
gorgement, individuals have agreed to rescind purchases of stock,"0 3
to "forgive certain limited partnership debts," ' to "forfeit certain
general partnership interests,"" 5 and to undertake "to forbear from
receiving any assets, properties or monies of [the corporate em-
ployer] in any distribution they would be entitled to participate in
as security holders or creditors."0 " Finally, it should be noted that
consent decrees have sometimes required a defendant to freeze his
personal assets, "except for the purpose of complying with the
court's restitution order,"4re or to post collateral to secure agreed
upon payments."'
Allegations of 10b-5 violations often are lodged against individ-
uals within the corporate hierarchy. The settlements which have
been consented to in such cases can be limited or broad. Defendants
have agreed not to serve on the board of directors of specified corpo-
1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 73; SEC v. Weston Int'l Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,378 (Apr. 29,
1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 537.
SEC v. Hurwitz, Litigation Release No. 7,451 (June 16, 1976), 9 SEC DocKxr 923.
"' SEC v. Goodman Sec. Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,567 (Sept. 17, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 540.
"I SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., Ltd., Litigation Release No. 7,244 (Jan. 19, 1976),
8 SEC DOCKET 1136; see SEC v. Silverberg, Litigation Release No. 8,625 (Dec. 22, 1978), 16
SEC DOCKET 583; SEC v. Manderano, Litigation Release No. 8,342 (Mar. 22, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 583; SEC v. Correa, Litigation Release No. 8,267 (Jan. 23, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET
60.
4w SEC v. TDA Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,369 (Apr. 23, 1976), 9 SEC DoCKEr
534.
402 SEC v. Rusco Indus., Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,144, at 91,129 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
,4- Id. at 91,129-30.
,01 SEC v. Silverberg, Litigation Release No. 8,625 (Dec. 22, 1978), 16 SEC DOCKET 583;
SEC v. Baum, Litigation Release No. 8,306 (Feb. 28, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 296; SEC v. TDA
Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,369 (Apr. 23, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 534.
"I SEC v. Goodman Sec. Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,567 (Sept. 17, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 540.
403 Id.
,0, SEC v. Giant Stores Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,546 (Sept. 2, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 400.
'10 SEC v. Weston Int'l Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,378 (Apr. 29, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 537.
"I SEC v. TDA Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,369 (Apr. 23, 1976), 9 SEC DocKT
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rations or as a trustee of an employee pension plan,"9 not to hold
any position as an officer or director of specified corporations, 10 to
be removed as an officer and director, 11 to be removed as a direc-
tor, 12 and to undertake "not to exercise control or influence over the
affairs of [a corporation], except through participation in [court
proceedings] .' '14  In more egregious circumstances, individual de-
fendants have agreed not to be associated as an officer or director
with any public company,"' not to assume "a position as either an
officer or director of any public company, except upon a showing
satisfactory to the court that measures have been taken to prevent
the conduct alleged in the Commission's complaint or conduct of
similar object or purport,'14  and "not to be associated with any
corporation whose securities are publicly held as an officer, director,
or, with respect to certain financial responsibilities, [as] an execu-
tive or like capacity."'1 6 An individual may also affect the manage-
ment of a corporation by the manner in which his shareholder voting
rights are exercised. Accordingly, individual defendants have agreed
not to vote certain securities, 1 not to vote in a proposed merger, 41
not to vote or influence "the voting of any shares of [the corpora-
tion] in which he has or had a record or beneficial interest,"''1 not
to vote on whether the corporation's stock should be delisted from
any national securities exchange,'42 to give an irrevocable proxy to
'" Litigation Release No. 7,318 (Mar. 18, 1976).
JI SEC v. Hurwitz, Litigation Release No. 7,451 (June 16, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 923;
SEC v. Generics Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,270 (Feb. 10, 1976), 8 SEC DoCKET 1291.
"I SEC v. TDA Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,369 (Apr. 23, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
534.
412 Id.
"I SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,508 (Aug. 2, 1976),
10 SEC DOCKET 194.
"I SEC v. Cosmopolitan Investors Funding Co., Litigation Release No. 8,419 (May 24,
1978), 14 SEC DocKEr 1217; SEC v. Giant Stores Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,546 (Sept.
2, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 400; SEC v. Timkin, C.A., Litigation Release No. 7,532 (Aug. 24,
1976), 10 SEC DocKET 309; SEC v. Nelson, Litigation Release No. 7,347 (Apr. 12, 1976), 9
SEC DOCKET 441.
I's SEC v. Cosmopolitan Investors Funding Co., Litigation Release No. 7,366 (Apr. 23,
1976), 9 SEC DocKEr 533.
"I SEC v. Giant Stores Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,546 (Sept. 2, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 400.
SEC v. TDA Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,369 (Apr. 23, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
534.
41" SEC v. Kodiak Indus., Litigation Release No. 7,622 (Oct. 28, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET
831.
41" SEC v. Generics Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,270 (Feb. 10, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET
1291.
420 SEC v. OSEC Petroleum, S.A., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp.
(CCH) 94,915, at 97,132 (D.D.C. 1974).
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someone satisfactory to the SEC,42 and not to nominate anyone to
the corporation's board of directors for 14 months.42
Where the individual's conduct has given rise to allegations of
10b-5 fraud unassociated with the operation or control of a corpora-
tion, the courts have approved sanctions which include the disclo-
sure of certain future activities, the correction of prior conduct, the
prohibition of similar conduct in the future, and the implementa-
tion of certain preventive measures. Disclosure measures have re-
quired an individual to "report to the Court and the Commission
all transactions in the securities of [the defendant corporation],' 42
to "disclose transactions in any securities acquired by him as con-
sideration for services performed as a merger broker, merger con-
sultant or corporate finder for any company whose securities were
the subject of a public offering and disclose transactions in any
securities acquired by him in any company whose securities are
publicly traded or whose securities have been the subject of a public
offering," 42 and to "file a report with the Commission identifying
his ownership or control of securities in certain enumerated corpora-
tions and their successors. '42 5
If the underlying charges relate to inaccuracies in required fil-
ings, at least one court has been willing to accept the defendant's
assurance of cooperation "in preparing and filing. . . amended or
corrected reports. ' ' 42 Another court has approved the parties agree-
ment to "implement and maintain certain policies and procedures
relating to . . . public relations activities which are reasonably cal-
culated to prevent the recurrence of the matters complained of in
[the] action. ' '42
The most common and often the most drastic measures limit-
ing an individual's actions involve prohibition. Defendants have
been prohibited from pledging or selling shares in a corporation,'4
"from acting as an unregistered broker-dealer, '429 from rendering
421 Id.
422 Id.
2 SEC v. Generics Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,270 (Feb. 10, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET
1291.
12 SEC v. Nelson, Litigaton Release No. 7,347 (Apr. 12, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 441.
425 Id.
42Z SEC v. Hurwitz, Litigation Release No. 7,451 (June 16, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 923.
427 SEC v. Giant Stores Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,546 (Sept. 2, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 400.
42z SEC v. OSEC Petroleum, S.A., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,915, at 97,132 (D.D.C. 1974).




any tax or other advice or recommendation in connection with the
offer and sale of tax-oriented securities,' from making "any untrue
statement of material fact or [omitting] to state a material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security which is the
subject of a distribution, ' 31 from purchasing "any security from a
broker-dealer pursuant to an understanding that such security will
be repurchased by the broker-dealer,"' from "the purchase or sale
of any security which is the subject of a distribution (a) where such
purchase or sale is made for the purpose of raising, maintaining or
depressing the price of such security; (b) where the purchase or sale
is made pursuant to a prior agreement or understanding that the
purchaser or seller is to be protected against loss or guaranteed a
profit in connection with the transaction or (c) is acting at the
request or upon the recommendation of [any] person who is a
participant in the distribution, except as permitted by Rules 10b-6
and 10b-7 under the Exchange Act,"'' 3 and from "effecting alone or
with any other persons, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or
sale of any gecurity by others, a series of transactions in any secu-
rity, . . .whether listed or not listed on a national securities ex-
change, which creates actual or apparent active trading in such
security, or which raises or depresses the price of such security."''
3. Special Consent Remedies for Attorneys and Accountants
By reason of their specialized activities, attorneys and accoun-
tants accused of 10b-5 violations in a court action or in an adminis-
trative proceeding have consented to sanctions peculiar to their sta-
tus. Note, however, that the more common sanctions are also avail-
able. " '
Provisions to which attorneys have consented include a perma-
nent injunction,'36 permanent disqualification from "appearing or
practicing before [the] Commission,' 37 a limited right to practice
' Id.




'3 SEC v. Nelson, Litigation Release No. 7,347 (Apr. 12, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 441.
'3'See notes 299-301 and accompanying text supra.
SEC v. Capital Planning Assocs., Litigation Release No. 7,572 (Sept. 20, 1976), 10
SEC DOCKET 541; SEC v. Sitomer, Sitomer & Porges, Litigation Release No. 7,418 (June 1,
1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 810; SEC v. Tex-A-Chief, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,278 (Feb. 10,
1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1293.
"I Alvin Lester Sitomer, Exchange Act Release No. 12,501 (June 1, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
784; see SEC v. Capitol Planning Assocs., Litigation Release No. 7,572 (Sept. 20, 1976), 10
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before the Commission,43 mandatory disclosure to future clients of
past violations or inability to practice before the SEC,43 and an
undertaking not to "hold the position of, or act as an officer or
director or otherwise direct the management and policies of any
publicly held company or trust.""' Attorneys have also agreed to be
prohibited "from being associated in a proprietary or supervisory
capacity with any broker or dealer,"44 ' to suspend "from any asso-
ciation with any broker or dealer,"," and "not [to] violate the anti-
fraud, periodic reporting or proxy provisions of the federal securities
laws."443
The Commission has obtained the following remedies against
consenting accountants: permanent injunction;444 denial of,445 resig-
nation from,4 ' or suspension from" appearing or practicing before
the Commission; censure; " 8 peer review by other accountants or
SEC DOCKET 541; Francois D.V. de LaBarre, Exchange Act Release No. 12,721 (Aug. 19,
1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 244; SEC v. Hurwitz, Litigation Release No. 7,451 (June 16, 1976), 9
SEC DOCKET 923; Robert H. Jaffe, Esq., Exchange Act Release No. 12,473 (,May 24, 1976), 9
SEC DOCKET 716; Morton Schimmel, Esq., Exchange Act Release No. 12,254 (Mar. 25, 1976),
9 SEC DOCKET 262; SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, Litigation Release No. 7,321 (Mar.
1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 290.
- SEC v. Nelson, Litigation Release No. 7,215 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC DOCKET 949.
41 SEC v. Ezrine, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,594, at
92,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
"I SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, Litigation Release No. 7,321 (Mar. 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 290.
"I Robert H. Jaffe, Esq., Exchange Act Release No. 12,473 (May 24, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 716; see SEC v. Giant Stores Corp., Litigation Release No. 7,546 (Sept. 2, 1976), 10
SEC DOCKET 400.
12 Robert H. Jaffe, Esq., Exchange Act Release No. 12,473 (May 24, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 716.
13 SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, Litigation Release No. 7,321 (Mar. 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 290.
" SEC v. Capitol Planning Assocs., Litigation Release No. 7,572 (Sept. 20, 1976), 10
SEC DOCKET 541; SEC v. Challenge Homes, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,344 (Apr. 5, 1976),
9 SEC DOCKET 400; SEC v. Tex-A-Chief, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,278 (Feb. 10, 1976), 8
SEC DOCKET 1293.
Eugene Testa, Accounting Series Release No. 212 (Apr. 18, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 67.
Wilbert S. Fox, Accounting Series Release No. 217 (May 16, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET
452; John W. Hosford, Accounting Series Release No. 216 (May 16, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET
451; Phillip J. Wilfson, Accounting Series Release No. 215 (May 9, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET
376; Bernard C. Zipern, Accounting Series Release No. 208 (Feb. 10, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET
1113; Paul D. Klinger, Accounting Series Release No. 201 (Nov. 23, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET
1038; Leigh A. Verley, Accounting Series Release No. 198 (Oct. 8, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 715.
"I George E. Weaver, Accounting Series Release No. 199 (Nov. 17, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET
977; Rudolph, Palitz & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 191 (Mar. 30, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
363.
" Rudolph, Palitz & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 191 (Mar. 30, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 363.
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members of the Commission's staff;-" ' participation "in a local firm
quality peer review program conducted by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants;"15 0 participation in "a program of
continuing professional education consistent with the guidelines
recommended by the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants on continuing education for professional members of said
association;' ' 1 and a prohibition on the acquisition of or merger
with other accounting firms.0
2
B. Administrative Actions
A substantial portion of the SEC's administrative actions focus
on the activities of brokers and dealers and investment advisers.
Since brokers and dealers and investment advisers are central to the
securities industry and are heavily regulated, special consent reme-
dies have evolved to supplement those which have been previously
discussed. Generally, the provisions contained in consent decrees
can be categorized as follows: censure; limitations on activities;
suspension; bar; revocation; special procedures; and monetary pay-
ments. A review of remedies approved by the Commission is facili-
tated by examining brokers' and dealers' settlements separately
from investment advisers' agreements.
1. Brokers and Dealers
The least severe circumstances have prompted the Commission
to approve censure in consent decrees.453 In acquiescing to more
severe limitations on activities, some broker-dealers are "required
to obtain written authorization from the compliance director or a
branch manager of any broker-dealer with which he may be asso-
ciated for any securities transactions for accounts in which he main-
"' Laventhol Krekstein Horwath & Horwath, Exchange Act Release No. 10,172 (May 23,
1973), 1 SEC DocKET 11.
" Rudolph, Palitz & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 191 (Mar. 30, 1976), 9 SEC
DocKET 363, 365.
41Id.
"I Laventhol Krekstein Horwath & Horwath, Exchange Act Release No. 10,172 (May 23,
1973), 1 SEC DocKET 11.
Ir See E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,538 (Jan. 30, 1979), 16 SEC
DocKEr 873; Goldman, Sachs & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,359 (Nov. 28, 1978), 16
SEC DocKEr 281; Michael Batterman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,278 (Mar. 29, 1976), 9
SEC DocKET 307; Gordon Sec. Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 12,272 (Mar. 31, 1976), 9
SEC DocKET 304; Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Suisse) S.A., Exchange Act Release
No. 12,192 (Mar. 11, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKEr 142; Bache & Co., Exchange Act Release No.
11,958 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC DocKET 898; Bache & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,957
(Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC DOcKET 898.
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tains a beneficial interest or for recommendations to more than
three customers for the purchase of any security," '454 and to obtain
written authorization from the compliance director or an officer of
any broker-dealer with which he may be associated for any recom-
mendations to more than three customers for the purchase of any
security.115
The bulk of reported remedies limiting a broker-dealer's activi-
ties, however, remains in the form of a simple prohibition or restric-
tion on effecting certain transactions. Thus, broker-dealers have
agreed to refrain from selling or purchasing, "either as principal for
[their] own account or as an agent for others . . .any shares of
[stock of a named corporation] in the United States or to or from
any United States citizen or resident . . . unless prior thereto that
corporation shall have filed and there shall have become effective
either a new registration statement relating to said shares or a post-
effective amendment to its registration statement;" '456 not to engage
in activities with or on behalf of a broker or dealer;5 7 to refrain from
furnishing to any inter-dealer quotation system any bid or asked
quotation with respect to any security as to which it had not fur-
nished any quotation;458 to limit business to the offer and sale of
securities effectively registered with the Commission and securities
offered and sold in reliance on an exemption from registration under
the Securities Act, provided that there is a written opinion of inde-
pendent counsel that such exemption is available or has been ob-
tained;459 to limit activities as a broker-dealer exclusively to the offer
and sale at retail or redeemable securities issued by investment
companies registered as such with the Commission under the In-
vestment Company Act;46 0 to refrain from serving in the capacities
William Dix, Exchange Act Release No. 12,448 (May 13, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 635.
'= Richard Peress, Exchange Act Release No. 12,476 (May 24, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 718;
Roger Nieman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,191 (Mar. 11, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 142; cf.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,421 (Dec. 20,
1978), 16 SEC DOCKET 517, 518 ("prior approval of [a] proposed trade from both the institu-
tional office manager . . . and the executive vice-president of [a named corporation]").
Rosmar Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,255 (Mar. 25, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 263.
,'7 Chartered New England Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,497 (June 1, 1976), 9
SEC DOCKET 781.
Is' Wildman, Neal & De Bolt, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,610 (Mar. 27, 1978), 14
SEC DOCKET 607; Colonial Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,287 (Dec. 19, 1977), 13
SEC DOCKET 1166; Singer & Mackie, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,526 (June 9, 1976),
9 SEC DOCKET 833.
15 Delger Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 13,579 (May 31, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 669.




specified in Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act;46' to limit
activities to acting as a supervised employee in a non-supervisory
capacity while associated with a broker-dealer, investment adviser,
investment company, or municipal securities dealer;462 to refrain
from tendering securities on behalf of another person in response to
a tender offer;6 3 to refrain from engaging in any business as or acting
as a underwriter of any public offerings registered with the Commis-
sion pursuant to the Securities Act or exempt from such registration
pursuant to Regulations A or B thereunder;" 4 and to refrain from
soliciting the retail purchase and/or recommending the retail pur-
chase of any security not admitted to trading on a national securi-
ties exchange, except a syndicate issue of which his present em-
ployer is a member of the underwriting or seller group.6 5
With regard to municipal securities, broker-dealers have con-
sented not to act, directly or indirectly, as an underwriter or partici-
pant in any underwriting,466 to clear all transactions in which they
act as either a broker or a dealer through a financial institution
whose deposits are insured by the FDIC,"7 and to restrict all trans-
actions in which they act as either a broker or dealer to such securi-
ties as have a minimum rating of "baa" or better, except for a
limited number of transactions involving the sale of nonrated secur-
ities to financial institutions located in the same geographic area as
the issuer of such securities.66 In one rather protective consent ord-
der, the respondent was prohibited from effecting transactions for
any investment company managed by a named company or for any
"I, First State Financial, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,463 (Jan. 8, 1979), 16 SEC
DOCKET 690; Gerald H. Cahill, Exchange Act Release No. 12,277 (Mar. 29, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 306; Howard F. Bovers, Exchange Act Release No. 12,008 (Jan. 13, 1976), 8 SEC
DOCKET 1021; Moe Fischer, Exchange Act Release No. 12,001 (Jan. 12, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKEr
1016. Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (1976), states that
an individual who violates the section may not serve or act "as an employee, officer, director,
member of an advisory board, investment advisor or depositor of, or principal underwriter
for, a registered investment company or affiliated persons of such investment advisor, deposi-
tor, or principal underwriter."
42 Frank J. Daffy, Exchange Act Release No. 13,374 (Mar. 14, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET
2003; Omega Financial Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,284 (Feb. 22, 1977), 11 SEC
DocKEr 1809.
"1 Gordon Sec. Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 12,272 (Mar. 31, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
304.
" Rosmar Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,255 (Mar. 25, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 264;
see Elmer I. Paull, Exchange Act Release No. 14,425 (Jan. 30, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 68.
"5 Roger Nieman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,191 (Mar. 11, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 142.





ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
other registered investment company, in securities of issuers which
are speculative and unseasoned unless the transactions are first
specifically approved by a committee composed of two nonaffiliated
directors and one affiliated director of the investment companies
after they have been furnished with a written recommendation de-
tailing the risks involved and reasons for such investments.'69
The options activity of brokers and dealers has prompted
charges which have resulted in agreements to avoid arranging for
the matching on the floor of any exchange of any stock transactions
generated by the purchase or sale of conventional options,470 to re-
frain from participating in that portion of his employer's business
relating to conventional options,47' to avoid selling conventional op-
tions on a given security in a given week in excess of an amount
covering 1,000 shares without acquiring such excess conventional
options from a third party within one business day of such sale,47
and to refrain from "buying or selling conventional option contracts
not traded on an option exchange. . . on any given security in any
given month in an amount that is greater than the lesser of an
amount of conventional options covering 15% of the total volume
traded in that security for the previous calendar month or an
amount of conventional options covering 10,000 shares of that secu-
rity." 473
The activities of brokers and dealers also have been limited by
suspension from certain activity such as sales,474 retail operations,4 75
market making,47 trading or otherwise dealing in securities in the
over-the-counter market,4 77 furnishing to any inter-dealer quotation
"I Robert E. Anton, Exchange Act Release No. 12,424 (May 11, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
619.
... Michael Batterman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,278 (Mar. 29, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
307.
17' Id.; see E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,538 (Jan. 30, 1979), 16 SEC
DOCKET 873; Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,723 (May 1,
1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 977.
72 Michael Batterman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,278 (Mar. 29, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
307.
473 Id.
17, ISI Sales Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,541 (June 14, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 877;
cf. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,579 (Mar. 20, 1978),
14 SEC DOCKET 520 (suspension from block trading).
5 Bache & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,958 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC DOCKET 898
(suspend if complies with undertaking).
,"I Colonial Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,287 (Dec. 19, 1977), 13 SEC
DOCKET 1166; Olde & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,952 (Dec. 24, 1975), 8 SEC DOCKET
895.




system any bid or asked quotation or appearing in name only," 8
trading on the American Stock Exchange of the respondent's home
office and branch office,4719 trading of industrial development reve-
nue bonds,48 and underwriting activities.48" ' The respondent and
the SEC often choose to suspend broker-dealer registration. 2 This
suspension, however, is frequently accompanied by exceptions
which allow the respondent to engage in certain transactions during
the suspension period which include, inter alia, liquidatingtransac-
tions to comply with the net capital rule,4 executing unsolicited
brokerage transactions for existing customers,4 continuing to sub-
mit quotations to The National Daily Quotation Service,"5 and par-
ticipating in principal transactions as a market maker with respect
to such securities as have been approved by the Commission's
staff.18 1 One settlement has even provided for the respondent to
withdraw its registration as a broker-dealer after the period of sus-
pension has expired.8 7
'l Wildman, Neal & De Bolt, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,610 (Mar. 27, 1978), 14
SEC DoCKEr 607; Colonial Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,287 (Dec. 19, 1977), 13
SEC DOCKET 1166; Brooks-Hamburger Sec., Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,695 (Aug. 6,
1976), 10 SEC DocKEr 214.
1'0 Alex Brown & Sons, Exchange Act Release No. 12,339 (Apr. 13, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
409; see Albert Fried & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,293 (Nov. 3, 1978), 16 SEC DOCKET
100.
" Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,847 (Oct. 1, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 652.
" ' First State Financial, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,463 (Jan. 18, 1979), 16 SEC
Docaer 690; Elmer I. Paull, Exchange Act Release No. 14,425 (Jan. 30, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET
68; Bond, Richman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,445 (May 13, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
633.
4,2 See Royal W. Carson & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 14,670 (Apr. 17, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 815; Gulf Inv. Bankers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,557 (Mar. 13, 1978),
14 SEC DOCKET 425; Delger Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 13,579 (May 31, 1977), 12
SEC DOCKET 669; Charles Stuart & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,884 (Oct. 12, 1976),
10 SEC DOCKET 696; OPI Investments, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,639 (July 19, 1976),
10 SEC DOCKET 1140; David Cannarsa, Exchange Act Release No. 12,234 (Mar. 19, 1976), 9
SEC DocKET 246.
10 Omega Financial Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,284 (Feb. 22, 1977), 11
SEC DocKer 1809; Kroeze, McLarty & Duddleston, Exchange Act Release No. 12,108 (Feb.
17, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1297.
" E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,538 (Jan. 30, 1979), 16 SEC DOCKET
873; Burke, Lawton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 14,759 (May 15, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET
1094; Hulme, Applegate & Humphrey, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,782 (Sept. 9, 1976),
10 SEC DocEr 415 (retail customers).
J.L. Schiffman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,204 (Mar. 15, 1976).
4m Id.
" Kurtz & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,520 (May 9, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 375;
Bramwell, Chandler, Johnson & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,499 (June 1, 1976), 9 SEC
DocKET 783; Steams & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,405 (May 3, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
550.
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In addition to suspension, brokers and dealers have been sus-
pended from association with other brokers or dealers, 88 investment
advisors,489 and municipal securities dealers.49 ° This form of suspen-
sion will sometimes provide that after the period of suspension the
respondent may associate with the broker or dealer in a nonsuper-
visory capacity upon a showing to the Commission of adequate
supervision. 4 ' Some settlements have permitted a broker-dealer
to become reassociated upon a showing that he has completed 10
hours of appropriate educational training concerning the duties and
responsibilities of persons associated with brokers or dealers under
"' E.g., First State Financial, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,463 (Jan. 8, 1979), 16
SEC DOCKET 690; Richard C. Flick, Exchange Act Release No. 14,629 (Apr. 3, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 653; Flow of Capital Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,472 (Feb. 15, 1978),
14 SEC DOCKET 178; Neil Stephens Inv. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 13,494 (May 2,
1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 293; Ross Pascall, Exchange Act Release No. 13,305 (Feb. 28, 1977),
11 SEC DOCKET 1876; Todd & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,285 (Feb. 22, 1977), 11
SEC DOCKET 1811; E.L. Aaron & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,015 (Nov. 29, 1976),
11 SEC DOCKET 1058; Cosse' Int'l Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,943 (Nov. 2,
1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 846; Brooks-Hamburger Sec., Co., Exchange Act Release No.
12,695 (Aug. 6, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 214; OPI Invs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
12,639 (July 19, 1976), 10 SEC DocKr 1140; Richard Peress, Exchange Act Release No.
12,476 (May 24, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr 718; Gerald Hodes, Exchange Act Release No. 12,310
(Apr. 5, 1976), 9 SEC DocKer 373; Chartered New England Corp., Exchange Act Release
No. 12,105 (Feb. 13, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1296; Church Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 12,057 (Jan. 28, 1976), 8 SEC DocKET 1164; Howard F. Bovers, Exchange Act Release
No. 12,008 (Jan. 13, 1976), 8 SEC DocKEr 1021; cf. Rosmar Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
12,255 (Mar. 25, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 263 (may continue association with co-defendant
broker-dealer only).
Some settlements have permitted the respondent to become associated with a broker-
dealer only in a non-supervisory capacity. E.g., Hulme, Applegate & Humphrey, Inc., Ex-
change Act Release No. 12,782 (Sept. 9, 1976), 10 SEC DocKer 415; Leonard Bros., Exchange
Act Release No. 12,294 (Mar. 31, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 325; Roger Nieman, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,191 (Mar. 11, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 142.
m First State Financial, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,463 (Jan. 8, 1979), 16 SEC
DOCKET 690; Frank S. Moran, Exchange Act Release No. 14,555 (Mar. 13, 1978), 14 SEC
DocKr 424; Financial Serv. Corp. of America, Exchange Act Release No. 12,002 (Jan. 12,
1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1017; see Lambert Hirsheimer, Exchange Act Release No. 12,589 (July
1, 1976), 9 SEC DocKr 989 (with exceptions); Robert E. Anton, Exchange Act Release No.
12,424 (May 11, 1976), 9 SEC DOcKET 619.
110 C.D. Pulis & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 14,470 (Feb. 14, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET
177; Kurtz & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,520 (May 9, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 375; Frank
J. Duffy, Exchange Act Release No. 13,374 (Mar. 14, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET 2003; Omega
Financial Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,284 (Feb. 22, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET 1809;
Howard Dulman, Exchange Act Release No. 11,961 (Dec. 30, 1975), 8 SEC DOCKET 900; see
Bernard Terrance Tierney, Exchange Act Release No. 13,464 (Apr. 25, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET
183.
49 Thornwell Inv. Management, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,285 (Oct. 31, 1978),
16 SEC DOCKET 6; Frank Gordon Putnam, Exchange Act Release No. 14, 812 (May 30,
1978), 14 SEC DocKEr 1230; Chartered New England Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,376
(Apr. 26, 1976), 9 SEC DocKr 492.
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the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws," 2 or that
he has successfully completed the examination required by the
NASD for principals of broker-dealers.493 In the latter instance the
agreement permitted the respondent to reassociate as a principal. 94
The Commission also has permitted respondents, during the period
of suspension, to execute unsolicited liquidating transactions for
existing clients and to execute other unsolicited transactions, pro-
vided, however, that they not receive any compensation for any
transactions effected during the suspension period. " Other cases
have allowed a broker-dealer to continue in his present supervised
capacity provided that he not communicate in any manner with any
customers of his employer. " In one case, the respondent was sus-
pended from engaging in any business as a securities broker or
dealer in the United States or engaging in any transaction or trans-
actions which, if made, would require registration with the SEC as
a broker-dealer.4 97
The permanent forms of discipline are a bar on association and
revocation of registration. Thus, broker-dealers have been barred
from association with any broker, dealer,499 investment adviser,4 " or
"1 Thomson & McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
13,012 (Nov. 26, 1976), 11 SEC DocKET 1055.
11 Flow of Capital Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,472 (Feb. 15, 1978), 14
SEC DOcKET 178, amended, Exchange Act Release No. 14,724 (May 1, 1978), 14 SEC DocKur
978; Omega Financial Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,284 (Feb. 22, 1977), 11 SEC
DocKET 1809.
" Omega Financial Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,284 (Feb. 22, 1977), 11
SEC DocKET 1809.
"I E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,538 (Jan. 30, 1979), 16 SEC DocKET
873; Burke, Lawton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 14,759 (May 15, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET
1094; John H. Weber, Exchange Act Release No. 12,868 (Oct. 5, 1976), 10 SEC DocKEr 662.
4 Bernard Terrance Tierney, Exchange Act Release No. 13,464 (Apr. 25, 1977), 12 SEC
DocKET 183.
I" Rosmar Corp., Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 12,255 (Mar. 25, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET
263.
', Donald H. Skaufel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,549 (Feb. 5, 1979), 16 SEC
DocxiEr 1031; Thornwell Inv. Management, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,285 (Oct.
31, 1978), 16 SEC DOCKET 6; IES Management Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
14,560 (Mar. 15, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 428; Nicholas Chiola, Exchange Act Release No.
13,463 (Apr. 25, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 183; Glade M. Knight, Exchange Act Release No.
13,087 (Dec. 21, 1976), 11 SEC DOCKET 1227; R. Wayne Everett & Assocs., Exchange Act
Release No. 12,792 (Sept. 13, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 459; Hibbard & O'Connor Sec. Church
Fin./Dev. Group Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,180 (Mar. 9, 1976), 9 SEC DocKr 131;
Thornton D. Morris & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,169 (Mar. 5, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr
125.
" First State Financial, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,463 (Jan. 8, 1979), 16 SEC
DocKET 690; Willis E. Burnside & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 14,556 (Mar. 13, 1978), 14
SEC DOcKEr 424; Charles E. Bach, Exchange Act Release No. 14,401 (Jan. 23, 1978), 14 SEC
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municipal securities dealer."' Some bar settlements permit associa-
tion in other than a supervisory or proprietary capacity.50 ' One con-
sent order barred the respondent from employment by or with any
DocKET 5; E.L. Aaron & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,015 (Nov. 29, 1976), 11 SEC
DOCKET 1058; Bernard Zipern, Exchange Act Release No. 12,679 (Aug. 2, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 167; James T. Bakos, Exchange Act Release No. 12,545 (June 15, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 879; Arnold Gerstein, Exchange Act Release No. 12,527 (June 9, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET
833; Alex Brown & Sons, Exchange Act Release No. 12,339 (Apr. 13, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr
409; Gerald H. Cahill, Exchange Act Release No. 12,277 (Mar. 29, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 306;
Rosmar Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,255 (Mar. 25, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr 263; Howard
F. Bovers, Exchange Act Release No. 12,008 (Jan. 13, 1976), 8 SEC Docr 1021; Evelyn
Harris, Exchange Act Release No. 12,007 (Jan. 13, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1021; Stephen
Smith, Exchange Act Release No. 11,971 (Jan. 2, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 972.
Willis E. Burnside & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 14,556 (Mar. 13, 1978), 14 SEC
DOCKET 424; Windsor Planning Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 13,306 (Feb. 28, 1977), 11
SEC DocKET 1876; Irving Levine, Exchange Act Release No. 12,665 (July 28, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 107; Harvey J. Ost, Exchange Act Release No. 12,575 (June 25, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
984; Edward Hayton, Exchange Act Release No. 12,185 (Mar. 9, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 139;
Sidney Bertram Weinberg, Exchange Act Release No. 12,126 (Feb. 24, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
3. Association with any NASD member also has been barred. David D. Esco, Exchange Act
Release No. 14,716 (Apr. 28, 1978), 14 SEC DocKEr 963; Steven C. Pruette, Exchange Act
Release No. 14,359 (Jan. 9, 1978), 13 SEC DOCKET 1345.
' Numerous settlements have prohibited association in a supervisory or proprietary
capacity. E.g., Donald R. Huffman, Exchange Act Release No. 15,481 (Jan. 8, 1979), 16 SEC
DocKEr 697; Shaughnessy & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 14,791 (May 23, 1978), 14 SEC
DocKEr 1167; Richard C. Flick, Exchange Act Release No. 14,629 (Apr. 3, 1978), 14 SEC
DocKET 653; Kurtz & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,520 (May 9, 1977), 12 SEC DocKET
375; Kenneth J. Welker, Exchange Act Release No. 13,233 (Feb. 2, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET
1631; James T. Bakos, Exchange Act Release No. 12,545 (June 15, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 879;
Branwell, Chandler, Johnson & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,499 (June 1, 1976), 9 SEC
DocET 783; William Dix, Exchange Act Release No. 12,448 (May 13, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET
635; Stearns & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,405 (May 3, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 550;
Roger Nieman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,191 (Mar. 11, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 142; Barry
J. Margulis, Exchange Act Release No. 11,976 (Jan. 5, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 974; John E.
Pedderson, Exchange Act Release No. 11,954 (Dec. 29, 1975), 8 SEC DOCKET 896; accord,
1* Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,829 (June 5, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 1304. Other
settlements have barred association other than as a supervised employee in a nonsupervisory
capacity. E.g., Robert Richard Rawlings, Exchange Act Release No. 13,543 (May 16, 1977),
12 SEC DOCKET 430; J. Kent Kinniburgh, Exchange Act Release No. 13,372 (Mar. 14, 1977),
11 SEC DOCKET 2002; Sheldon Fidler, Exchange Act Release No. 13,286 (Feb. 22, 1977), 11
SEC DOCKET 1811; Allison-James, Inc., Exchange Act Release No., 13,257 (Feb. 14, 1977),
11 SEC DOCKET 1720; E.L. Aaron & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,015 (Nov. 29, 1976),
11 SEC DOCKET 1058; Gerald J. Vanderzon, Exchange Act Release No. 12,983 (Nov. 16, 1976),
10 SEC DOCKET 958; Philip Richman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,864 (Oct. 5, 1976), 10
SEC DocKET 660; Mitchell B. Walker, Exchange Act Release No. 12,867 (Oct. 5, 1976), 10
SEC DOCKET 661; Chartered New England Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,376 (Apr. 26,
1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 492; Gerald Hodes, Exchange Act Release No. 12,310 (Apr. 5, 1976), 9
SEC DOCKET 373; Edward Stansfield, Exchange Act Release No. 12,128 (Feb. 23, 1976), 9
SEC DOCKET 4; Chartered New England Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,105 (Feb. 13,
1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1296; Church Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,057 (Jan. 28,
1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1164; Financial Serv. Corp. of America, Exchange Act Release No.
12,002 (Jan. 12, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1017; accord, Stephenson, Leydecker & Co., Exchange
Act Release No. 12,475 (May 24, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 717.
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broker-dealer, except -his present employer, "unless such broker-
dealer is either a member of the New York Stock Exchange or the
American Stock Exchange or a member of the NASD and/or any
predecessor thereof has been a member of the NASD for three years
and the principals of such member of the NASD have combined
experience as principals of no less than five years, '5 0 2 while another
permitted association only with SEC approval.1°3 The Commission
has also allowed a respondent to make application for reassociation
with an investment adviser in order to enable him to render advice
as an offeree representative as defined in Rule 146 under the 1933
Act.504
Revocation of a broker-dealer's registration"' is another possi-
bility. Subject to limited exceptions, when this remedy is utilized
the revocation is usually total.5 0 One order required the respondent
to commence withdrawal proceedings with respect to its registration
as a broker-dealer or undertake to implement additional supervisory
procedures to prevent a recurrence of the violative activities and
employ a competent back office supervisor and manager. 7 Included
"1 Edmond L. Brown, Exchange Act Release No. 12,208 (March 15, 1976).
"0 Dewey, Johnson & George, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,268 (March 25, 1976),
9 SEC DocKEr 268.
m Melvin Spielman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,727 (Aug. 23, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET
268; cf. Victor Tostado, Exchange Act Release No. 15,357 (Nov. 27, 1978), 16 SEC DOCKET
280 (may reapply after 42 months for a non-supervisory position); Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,722 (May 1, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 976 (may
reapply after 2 years for a nonsupervisory position); Frank S. Groseclose, Exchange Act
Release No. 14,479 (Feb. 16, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 188 (may reapply after 1 year for a non-
supervisory position and may reapply after 2 years for a supervisory position); Peter E. Aaron,
Exchange Act Release No. 14,399 (Jan. 23, 1978), 14 SEC DocKEr 5 (may reapply after 21
months for any position).
- Donald H. Skaufel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,549 (Feb. 5, 1979), 16 SEC
DocKEr 1031; Nassar & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,347 (Nov. 22, 1978), 16 SEC
DOCKET 228; Thornwell Inv. Management, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,285 (Oct.
31, 1978), 16 SEC DocKET 6; Ronald M. Gottfried, Exchange Act Release No. 14,426 (Jan.
30, 1978), 14 SEC DocKr 69; Investors Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,238
(Mar. 22, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr 248; First Midwest Inv. Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
12,179 (Mar. 8, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 130; Thornton D. Morris & Co., Exchange Act Release
No. 12,169 (Mar. 5, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKEr 125; Merit Investors Corp., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 12,085 (Feb. 9, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1240; Church Sec., Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 12,057 (Jan. 28, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1164; Charles Plohn & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 12,033 (Jan. 22, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1099; Parallel Sec., Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 12,013 (Jan. 13, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1024; Financial Serv. Corp. of America,
Exchange Act Release No. 12002 (Jan. 12, 1976), 8 SEC DOCKET 1017.
"0 Howard Lawrence & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,573 (June 24, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 956.
'l Hulme, Applegate & Humphrey, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,782 (Sept. 9,
1976), 10 SEC DocKEr 415; see Flow of Capital Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,472
(Feb. 15, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKEr 178; C.D. Pulis & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 14,470
(Feb. 14, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 177.
19791
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
within the category of revocation are orders which deny or delay
broker-dealer registration until certain conditions are fulfilled. 508
Similarly, the SEC has conditioned a respondent's ability to apply
for membership in the NASD upon prior consent of the Commis-
sion.5
Numerous Commission-approved consent orders require that
special procedures be adopted to prevent recurrence of the alleged
10b-5 violation and to inform customers and regulatory agencies of
certain activities. The emphasis, therefore, is on remedial measures.
Accordingly, broker-dealers have agreed to "institute and maintain
procedures reasonably to be expected to prevent and detect, insofar
as practicable, the reoccurrence" of alleged violations,510 to
"implement a compliance program establishing a procedure
whereby any over-the-counter securities shall not be recommended
and/or purchased on behalf of any retail customers without the prior
approval of a committee of three partners of the security to be
recommended," ' to implement procedures designed to ensure full
disclosure of costs, risks and alternatives to customers in certain
specified transactions, 12 to adopt certain operating procedures and
implement a compliance and inspection program relating to the
trading of securities and the maintenance of books and records at
the firm, 13 and to institute specific written procedures designed to
prevent violations of Rule 10b-4.514 Orders also have contained re-
quirements to attend a course covering the NASD and SEC rules
and regulations governing brokers and dealers, " to inform present
and future customers of the existence and nature of the subject
proceedings, sanctions and prior injunctions,516 to file monthly fin-
See OPI Inv., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,639 (July 19, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKEr 1140; SMW Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,375 (Apr. 26, 1976), 9 SEC
DocKEr 492; John H. Clifton, Exchange Act Release No. 12,094 (Feb. 9, 1976), 8 SEC DocKEr
1245.
Rosmar Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,255 (Mar. 25, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr 263.
50 Albert Fried & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,293 (Nov. 13, 1978), 16 SEC DocKET
100; Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,723 (May 1, 1978), 14
SEC DoCKr 977; Thomson & McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 13,012 (Nov. 26, 1976), 11 SEC DocKET 1055; Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 12,223 (Mar. 17, 1976).
"I Dr. Kan Chi Mui, Exchange Act -Release No. 15,381 (Dec. 4, 1978), 16 SEC DocKEr
346; Bell & Beckwith, Exchange Act Release No. 12,447 (May 13, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 634.
512 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,421 (Dec.
20, 1978), 16 SEC DocKEr 517; ISI Sales Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,541 (June 14,
1976), 9 SEC DocKEr 877.
53 Charles Stuart & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,884 (Oct. 12, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKEr 696.




ancial statements as required by Rule 17a-11 of the 1934 Act on
Form X-17A-5, 57 and to advise the SEC of the empioyment of any
person who has been enjoined from further securities violations and
thereafter implement suitable supervisory procedures for such per-
son, which procedures shall have been found to be non-
objectionable by the SEC prior to the employment of any such
person .5 1 Finally, broker-dealers have agreed to create and keep
current all books and records required by the Exchange Act and
rules thereunder, 519 to appoint an independent director,520 to retain
special counsel," and to retain independent, duly licensed auditors
who have had previous experience in the examination of the finan-
cial statements of broker-dealers. 22
The final category of sanctions involving broker-dealers is mon-
etary awards. Monetary provisions have called for the respondent
to pay a specified sum of money,523 to pay "all compensation for
services performed during suspension, ' '15 A to establish a "fund con-
sisting of certain revenues to be derived, ''525 "to pay all compensa-
tion, including salaries, commissions, and bonuses, earned and to
be paid and payable to him" from a certain investment company,5 21
to disgorge the gross commission and foreign exchange gain which
515 Robert Byron Stanat, Exchange Act Release No. 12,908 (Oct. 19, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 729; Nolan Twibell, Exchange Act Release No. 12,907 (Oct. 19, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET
729.
" Gulf Inv. Bankers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,460 (Apr. 22, 1977), 12 SEC
DocKEr 83.
"I Id.; see David Cannarsa, Exchange Act Release No. 12,234 (Mar. 19, 1976), 9 SEC
DocKEr 246.
M Delger Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 13,579 (May 31, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 669.
-1' David Cannarsa, Exchange Act Release No. 12,234 (Mar. 19, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKEr
246.
SEC v. Inventive Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7,959 (June 7, 1977), 12 SEC
DOCKET 808.
521 Chartered New England Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 12,497 (June 1, 1976), 9
SEC DOCKET 781.
W David Cannarsa, Exchange Act Release No. 12,234 (Mar. 19, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
246.
n Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,579 (Mar. 20,
1978), 14 SEC DocKEr 520; Gulf Inv. Bankers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,557 (Mar.
13, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 425; Lambert Hirsheimer, Exchange Act Release No. 12,589
(July 1, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 989; Robert E. Anton, Exchange Act Release No. 12,424 (May
11,1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 619.
1 Lambert Hirsheimer, Exchange Act Release No. 12,589 (July 1, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
989.
991 Michael Batterman, Exchange Act Release No. 12,278 (Mar. 29, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr
307; see Albert Fried & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,293 (Nov. 3, 1978), 16 SEC DOCKET
100.
" Robert E. Anton, Exchange Act Release No. 12,424 (May 11, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET
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he received, 52 to pay persons who purchased bonds one-half their
loss, 528 and to increase net capital as defined by Rule 15c3-1 under
the Exchange Act."'
2. Investment Advisers
The remedies approved by the Commission where the respon-
dent is an investment adviser parallel those imposed upon broker-
dealers. Censure,53 of course, is the least stringent. An investment
adviser's activities have been limited in various ways, including a
moratorium on solicitation of new clients,53' a prohibition on manag-
ing and supervising securities accounts for clients,53 2 and a prohibi-
tion on engaging in any transaction as an investment adviser with
any person or entity which at the time of the transaction is a cus-
tomer of respondent's affiliated broker-dealer.rs Furthermore, in-
vestment advisers have consented to suspension from association
with any investment adviser 34 or broker-dealer.5 35 Some settle-
52 Gordon Sec., Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 12,272 (Mar. 31, 1976), 9 SEC
DocKEr 304.
12. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 12,847 (Oct. 1, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKET 652.
In Gulf Inv. Bankers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,460 (Apr. 22, 1977), 12 SEC
DocKEr 83.
A. Feldesman & Assocs., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 653 (Dec. 5, 1978), 16
SEC DocKET 416; Independent Investor Publications, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 630 (May 15, 1978), 14 SEC DocKET 1154; Consolidated Business Servs., Inc., Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 587 (May 19, 1977), 12 SEC DocKr 449; Dow Theory Letters, Inc.,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 571 (Feb. 22, 1977), 11 SEC Doc=ET 1855; Capital
Consultants, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 556 (Dec. 1, 1976), 11 SEC DocKEr
1107; Collett & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12,784 (Sept. 9, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKEr 417;
Donelan, Phelps & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 530 (Aug. 23, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKEr 206; R.D.P. Investments, Ltd., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 509 (Apr. 12,
1976), 9 SEC DocKET 440.
-" Dow Theory Letters, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 571 (Feb. 22, 1977),
11 SEC DocKEr 1855.
m R.D.P. Investments, Ltd., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 509 (Apr. 12, 1976),
9 SEC DOCKET 440.
m Donelan, Phelps & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 530 (Aug. 23, 1976), 10
SEC DocKET 266.
Im First State Financial, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 655 (Jan. 8, 1979),
16 SEC DocKEr 690; Consolidated Business Servs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 587 (May 19, 1977), 12 SEC DoCKET 449; Sanders Inv. Advisory Corp., Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 537 (Sept. 14, 1976), 10 SEC DOcKET 496; Ronald L. Damask,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 531 (Aug. 30, 1976), 10 SEC DocKET 393; R.D.P. Invs.,
Ltd., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 509 (Apr. 12, 1976), 9 SEC DocKEr 440.
m Donald R. Huffman, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 657 (Jan. 8, 1979), 16 SEC
DoCKET 697; Robert Antolini, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 656 (Jan. 8, 1979), 16 SEC
DOCKEr 696; Bernard G. Greer, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 510 (Apr. 12, 1976), 9
SEC DocKET 441.
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ments, however, permit association as a non-supervisory employee
under supervision deemed adequate by the SEC.51 Other settle-
ments provide that the suspension be without any form of compen-
sation or accrual of compensation attributable to the period of sus-
pension.5 17
Investment advisers have been barred from association with
any broker, dealer, or investment adviser,53 from having any finan-
cial interest or any position as partner, director, or officer in any
broker, dealer, or investment adviser which manages or supervises
securities accounts for clients, 39 and from "serving or acting as an
employee, officer, director, member of an advisory board, invest-
ment adviser, or depositor of, or principal underwriter for, a regis-
tered investment company or affiliated person of such investment
adviser, depositor, or principal underwriter."' 0 These provisions,
however, sometimes permit continued association as an adequately
supervised employee in a non-supervisory or non-proprietary capac-
ity." Moreover, investment adviser registration has been revoked 5 2
"I, American Gen. Capital Management, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No.
616 (Feb. 23, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 240; Cumulo Management, Inc., Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 569 (Feb. 7, 1977), 11 SEC DOCKET 1109.
" Capital Consultants, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 556 (Dec. 1, 1976),
11 SEC DocKEr 1107.
uR Kay Harrison, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 547 (Oct. 26, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKEr 784; Jerry L. Dover, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 519 (June 9, 1976), 9 SEC
DOCKET 865; see Financial Profiles, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 586 (May 10,
1977), 12 SEC DocKET 377; Brtuce Keller Financial Advisers, Inc., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 568 (Feb. 3, 1977),i 11SEC DOCKET 1661; F.C. Berckefeldt & Co., Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 540 (Oct. 4, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKEr 683; John C. Schick, Exchange
Act Release No. 12,783 (Sept. 9, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKEr 416; H. William Alexander, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 521 (June 17, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 915. In some cases, the
defendant was barred from associating only with investment advisers. Luis Delacruz, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 552 (Nov. 16, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 973; J.L. Mead & Co.,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 512 (May 10, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 660; Bowen & Bowen
& Assocs., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 502 (Mar. 9, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 172.
-' First State Financial, Inc., Investment Act Release No. 655 (Jan. 8, 1979), 16 SEC
DocKET 690; R.D.P. Inv., Ltd., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 509 (Apr. 12, 1976),
9 SEC DocKET 440.
mO Luis Delacruz, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 552 (Nov. 16, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKEr 973; Kay Harrison, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 547 (Oct. 26, 1976), 10 SEC
DocKEr 784.
"I Sanders Inv. Advisory Corp., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 537 (Sept. 14,
1976), 10 SEC DocKET 495.
5I Cardinal Management Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 628 (May 1, 1978),
14 SEC DocKEr 1027; F.C. Berckefeldt & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 540 (Oct.
4, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKET 683; Sanders Inv. Advisory Corp., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 537) (Sept. 14, 1976), 10 SEC DOCKEr 495; H. William Alexander, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 521 (June 17, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 915; J.L. Mead & Co., Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 512 (May 10, 1976), 9 SEC DocKET 660; Bowen & Bowen &
Assocs., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 502 (Mar. 9, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 172.
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or denied 43 pursuant to SEC approved settlements.
As with broker-dealers, investment advisers often consent to
remedial measures which focus on preventing future violations and
informing customers and the SEC of certain activity. Thus, a con-
senting respondent agreed to furnish in advance to the SEC "the
names of any accounts, other than his own or that of his spouse, in
which security transactions are effected and in which he has any
direct or indirect beneficial interest;"' 4 conduct his personal invest-
ment activities pursuant to a special policy should he become asso-
ciated with any investment adviser registered with the Commission
in the capacity of an "advisory representative"; 55 mail a true copy
of the SEC's order to each of its current clients and each of its
former clients; 4' file an affidavit with the Commission certifying
that the order has been compiled with;5 ' and submit to the SEC a
report setting forth the information as required by paragraph (a) (12)
of Rule 204-2 under the Investment Advisers Act and like informa-
tion for fiduciary accounts to which respondent is a registered or
unregistered investment adviser.5 ' To compensate injured inves-
tors, the SEC has prompted investment advisers to contribute a
specified sum of money "to be applied as a credit against respon-
dent's clients' accounts," '549 to resolve respondent's "disputes with
clients or former clients arising out of the allegations contained in
[the order] ,"' ' and to make pro rata refunds to clients for whom
it presently manages securities accounts of the fees received for
managing these accounts and submit an affidavit to the SEC's staff
that shall attest that these refunds have been made.51
Jerry L. Dover, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 519 (June 9, 1976), 9 SEC
DocKEr 865.
ml Richard C. Goldstein, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 583 (Apr. 26, 1977), 12
SEC DocKr 269; see Dow Theory Letters, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 571
(Feb. 22, 1977), 11 SEC DocKEr 1855.
"I Richard C. Goldstein, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 583 (Apr. 26, 1977), 12
SEC DocKEr 269.
50 Capital Consultants, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 556 (Dec. 1, 1976),
11 SEC DocKEr 1107.
Id.
Richard C. Goldstein, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 583 (Apr. 26, 1977), 12
SEC DocKgr 269.
" Consolidated Business Servs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 587 (May
19, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 449; see Capital Consultants, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 556 (Dec. 1, 1976), 11 SEC DOCKEr 1107.
Capital Consultants, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 556 (Dec. 1, 1976),
11 SEC DocKET 1107.
"! Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
To the attorney representing persons accused of a violation of
Rule 10b-5 a working knowledge of the vast range of available reme-
dies is most valuable. Accordingly, the practitioner must be able to
inform his client of the difference in potential exposure between full
term litigation and settlement. Indeed, in advising a client faced
with a 10b-5 charge, it may be more important to consider the
possible sanctions rather than whether the SEC will be able to
establish liability under the securities laws. In response to the prac-
titioner's need, this Article has attempted to set forth a broad and,
at the same time, detailed description of the available remedies.
